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“Today, we have entered the home stretch to universal suf-
frage.”
– Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor, Hong Kong Chief Secretary,
December 4, 2013
“[T]he principle that the Chief Executive has to be a person
who loves the country and loves Hong Kong must be upheld.”
– National People’s Congress Standing Committee, August 31,
2014
“We do not consider that the terms of the 31 August . . . deci-
sion offer ‘genuine choice’ in any meaningful sense of the phrase,
nor do we consider the decision consistent with the principle that
Hong Kong should enjoy a high degree of autonomy.”
– U.K. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, March
6, 2015
INTRODUCTION: WE’RENOT LITTLE CHILDREN
n August 31, 2014, the National People’s Congress Stand-
ing Committee (“NPCSC”) ruled out democratic elections
 Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor, H.K. Chief Sec’y for Administration,
Speech to Legislative Council (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.news.gov.hk/tc/rec-
ord/html/2013/12/20131204_141632.shtml, author’s translation.
 Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui ChangwuWeiyuanhui Guanyu Xiang-
gang Tebie Xingzhengqu Xingzheng Zhangguan Puxuan Wenti He 2016 Nian
Lifa Hui Chansheng Banfa De Jueding
(全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於香港特別行政區行政長官普選問題和 2016年立
法會產生辦法的決定) [Decision of the Standing Committee of the National Peo-
ple’s Congress on Issues Relating to the Selection of Chief Executive of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and on the
Method for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region In the Year 2016] (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat’l Peo-
ple’s Cong., Aug. 31, 2014).
 Foreign Affairs Committee, The UK’s Relations With Hong Kong: 30
Years After the Joint Declaration, 2014–15, H.C. 649 (U.K.).
O
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for Hong Kong’s legislature in 2016 and for its Chief Executive
in 2017.1 The NPCSC’s Decision (“the 2014 Decision”) declared
that the implementation of universal suffrage in Hong Kong im-
plicated China’s “sovereignty, security and development inter-
ests.”2 It therefore imposed strict conditions on nomination and
candidacy to ensure that candidates were politically acceptable
to Beijing.3 Meanwhile, Beijing inveighed against collusion with
external forces by democratic activists in Hong Kong and sought
to block a British inquiry into developments in the former U.K.
colony on the basis that it constituted “interference in China’s
internal affairs.”4
This was not the first time foreign concern over Hong Kong’s
democratization had drawn a harsh Chinese response. In an op-
ed published in Hong Kong’s Chinese- and English-language pa-
pers of record on September 14, 2013,5 Hugo Swire, Minister of
1. See, e.g., Chris Buckley & Michael Forsythe, China Restricts Voting Re-
forms for Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1ndHqh9. See
also Alex Lo, The Rotten Boroughs That Are the Main Stumbling Block to Re-
form, S. CHINAMORNINGPOST (H.K.), Jan. 31, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/com-
ment/insight-opinion/article/1696759/rotten-buroughs-are-main-stumbling-
block-reform.
2. Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Xiang-
gang Tebie Xingzhengqu Xingzheng Zhangguan Puxuan Wenti He 2016 Nian
Lifa Hui Chansheng Banfa De Jueding (全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於香港
特別行政區行政長官普選問題和 2016 年立法會產生辦法的決定) [Decision of the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to
the Selection of Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion by Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the Legislative
Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region In the Year 2016]
(adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 2014) [herein-
after 2014 Decision].
3. See Buckley & Forsythe, supra note 1.
4. See 陳佐洱：不與「漢奸港獨」做朋友 [Chen Zuoer: Will Not Befriend
“Traitors, Separatists”], MINGPAO (H.K.), Aug. 30, 2014 and Laura
Kuenssberg, China Accuses MPs of Hong Kong ‘Interference’, BBCNEWS (Sept.
1, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-29016776.
5. Hugo Swire, 選舉、民主和香港的未來 [Voting, Democracy and the Fu-
ture of Hong Kong], MINGPAO (H.K.), Sept. 14, 2013; Hugo Swire, People Must
Have a Genuine Choice in the 2017 Chief Executive Election, S. CHINAMORNING
POST (H.K.), Sept. 14, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/ar-
ticle/1309205/people-must-have-genuine-choice-2017-chief-executive. See also
Hugo Swire, Voting, Democracy and the Future of Hong Kong, GOV.UK (Sept.
14, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/voting-democracy-and-
the-future-of-hong-kong.
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State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (“FCO”) of the
United Kingdom, stated his support for the introduction of uni-
versal suffrage in Hong Kong. Swire reiterated the United King-
dom’s commitment to Hong Kong under the Sino-British Joint
Declaration of 1984 (“Joint Declaration”), adding, “the U.K.
stands ready to support [Hong Kong’s transition to universal
suffrage] in any way [it] can.”6 Official responses ranged from
the unfriendly to the vitriolic. Leung Chun-ying (梁振英; com-
monly known as “C.Y. Leung”), the city’s Chief Executive, as-
serted that Hong Kong needed no foreign support to implement
universal suffrage.7 The People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) For-
eign Ministry denounced British intervention in Hong Kong’s in-
ternal affairs. 8 Official media cited ominous warnings from
Hong Kong-based pro-Beijing papers about the influence of Brit-
ish spies “across the city’s government, judiciary, chambers of
commerce and the media.”9 Pro-democracy remarks by Clifford
Hart, the American Consul-General, were met with a similarly
hostile response.10
6. Id.
7. Tanna Chong & Stuart Lau, Beijing to Britain: Stop Interfering With
Hong Kong’s Internal Affairs, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), Sept. 17, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1311049/beijing-britain-stop-in-
terfering-hong-kongs-internal-affairs?page=all; 梁振英：政改毋須外國援助
[C.Y. Leung: Political Reform Requires No Foreign Assistance], MINGPAO
INSTANT NEWS (Sept. 27, 2013, 2:07 PM), http://inews.mingpao.com/htm/IN-
ews/20130927/gb51407k.htm.
8. Chong & Lau, supra note 7.
9. Te-Ping Chen, Hong Kong Riddled With British Spies, Reports Say,
CHINA REAL TIME (Sept. 18, 2013, 6:17 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/china-
realtime/2013/09/18/hong-kong-riddled-with-british-spies-reports-say/.
10. See, e.g.,京官轟夏千福沒資格談普選 [Beijing Officials Slam Clifford Hart
as Unqualified to Discuss Universal Suffrage], APPLE DAILY (H.K.), Sept. 26,
2013. In a speech on September 24, 2013, Hart said that the United States had
“no prescription for Hong Kong’s electoral process,” but it would not be silenced
by China in its support of democracy. Keith Bradsher,U.S. Envoy Affirms Sup-
port for Universal Suffrage in Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/25/world/asia/us-envoy-affirms-support-for-
universal-suffrage-in-hong-kong.html; Greg Torode, New U.S. Envoy to Hong
Kong Vows to Push For Democracy, REUTERS, Sept. 24, 2013, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/24/us-hongkong-usa-
idUSBRE98N09820130924. Although German Consul-General Nikolaus von
der Wenge Graf Lambsdorff has also made remarks in support of universal
suffrage, the author is not currently aware of any official response by the Hong
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Beijing’s shrill response to foreign comments on Hong Kong
may belie unease about its failure to meet its international legal
commitments. In the Joint Declaration, China promised Hong
Kong a “high degree of autonomy” under the doctrine of “One
Country, Two Systems” (一國兩制). Hong Kong would have an
elected legislature after the resumption of Chinese sovereignty
in 1997. The city’s Chief Executive—its head of government—
would be selected through elections or consultations.11 The pro-
visions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”) that the United Kingdom had acceded to on
Hong Kong’s behalf would continue to apply.12 China later en-
shrined its commitments to Hong Kong’s democratization in the
Basic Law, the constitutional instrument for the country’s first
Special Administrative Region (“SAR”).13 Articles 45 and 68 of
the Basic Law proclaimed that the “ultimate aim” would be for
Hong Kong to choose its Chief Executive and its legislature
through universal suffrage.14
Yet, more than seventeen years after the transfer of sover-
eignty, China’s promises of democratization in Hong Kong ring
increasingly hollow. China butted heads with the United King-
dom over electoral arrangements for the city’s Legislative Coun-
cil (“Legco”) throughout the 1990s; 15 it ultimately reversed Brit-
ish reforms by setting up its own shadow legislature.16 After
Kong or Beijing Governments, See On Democracy, HARBOURTIMES (H.K.), Jan.
10, 2014, available at http://harbourtimes.com/openpublish/article/democracy.
11. See “B. Background to the Joint Declaration,” infra, at 14. See also “C.
The Joint Declaration,” infra, at 46.
12. See “E. The ICCPR,” infra, at 50.
13. Macau, previously a Portuguese colony, became the second SAR on De-
cember 20, 1999. See Joe Havely, What Now for Macau? BBC NEWS (Dec. 20,
1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/566074.stm.
14. See infra Part II.D.
15. See Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism in Hong Kong: Politics Versus
Economics, 18 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 157, 169–73 (1997). See also infra Part
I.D.
16. See infra Part I.D.
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1997, the NPCSC repeatedly pushed back the deadline for de-
mocratization.17 In 2007, the NPCSC promised universal suf-
frage in the 2017 Chief Executive elections.18 Yet the 2014 Deci-
sion spells out—more clearly than any previous statement—that
China’s “bottom line” is a power of veto over candidates with po-
litical views it deems repugnant.19
Beijing’s repeated moving of the goalposts is significant be-
cause it calls into question the PRC’s willingness to abide by its
obligations under international law. As a result, it has prompted
growing international fears for the territory’s future. Despite the
hostile Chinese reception to the statements by Swire and Hart,
the German Consul-General added his voice to the chorus in
early 2014, stating, “[w]ith universal suffrage, our understand-
ing is everybody has a vote and everybody can run.”20 Sir Rich-
ard Ottaway, the Chair of the U.K. House of Commons Foreign
Affairs Committee, declared on September 2, 2014, that there
was “a prima facie case” that the 2014 Decision violated the
Joint Declaration.21
Beijing’s lengthy history of default has had two major conse-
quences. First, the absence of electoral reform has created an
ongoing crisis of legitimacy. In 2012, C.Y. Leung was selected as
17. Lorenz Langer, Electoral Reform in Hong Kong: From Schedule to Sub-
stance, 22 H.K. J. (2011).
18. Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Xiang-
gang Tebie Xingzhengqu 2012 Nian Xingzheng Zhangguan He Lifa Hui Chans-
heng Banfa Ji Youguan Puxuan Wenti de Jueding (全國人民代表大會常務委員
會關於香港特別行政區 2012年行政長官和立法會產生辦法及有關普選問題的決定)
[Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Is-
sues Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative Council
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and on Is-
sues Relating to Universal Suffrage] (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2007), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xin-
wen/syxw/2007-12/29/content_1387576.htm [hereinafter 2007 Decision].
19. See 2014 Decision, supra note 2. See also Xiaoyang Qiao, 喬曉陽在香港
立法會部分議員座談會上的講話[Qiao Xiaoyang’s Remarks at a Seminar With
Some Members of the H.K. Legislative Council] (Mar. 24, 2013),
http://www.locpg.gov.cn/shouyexinwen/201303/t20130327_7135.asp.
20. On Democracy, supra note 10.
21. Malcolm Moore, China “Has Breached Terms of Hong Kong Handover”,
TELEGRAPH, Sept. 2, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world-
news/asia/hongkong/11069949/China-has-breached-terms-of-Hong-Kong-
handover.html.
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Chief Executive by an Electoral Committee of 1,200 people in a
process the Economist described as a “farce.”22 In the same year,
half of the legislative seats were chosen through a “functional
constituency” voting system previously condemned by the U.N.
Human Rights Committee as a system of unequal suffrage.23
Second, public cynicism about “One Country, Two Systems” has
taken root. The Hong Kong Government’s consultation on Chief
Executive electoral reform for 2017 was met with suspicion, even
before the consultation document’s release.24 In December 2013,
a University of Hong Kong survey revealed that 42.3 percent of
respondents had no confidence in “One Country, Two Sys-
tems.”25 The perception of bad faith in the part of Beijing and
Hong Kong Governments even prompted calls for mass civil dis-
obedience,26 culminating in the Umbrella Movement protests of
2014.27
22. Hong Kong’s Chief-Executive “Election”: TheWorst System, Including All
the Others, ECONOMIST, Mar. 31, 2012, http://www.econo-
mist.com/node/21551482. See also infra Part I.H.
23. See Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human
Rights Comm., ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.57 (1995) [hereinafter 1995
Concluding Observations]; SARAH JOSEPH & MELISSA CASTAN, THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS,
AND COMMENTARY 742 (3d ed. 2013). For a detailed explanation of functional
constituencies, see SIMON N.M. YOUNG & ANTHONY LAW, A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION TOHONGKONG’S FUNCTIONAL CONSTITUENCIES (2004), available
at http://www.law.hku.hk/ccpl/Docs/FCsreport.pdf. See also infra Part II.D.
24. See Tanna Chong & Stuart Lau, Popular Nomination for Chief Executive
Still A Possibility, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), Nov. 24, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1364804/popular-nomination-
chief-executive-still-possibility; Tanna Chong & Tony Cheung, Li Fei Offers
More Questions Than Answers, S. CHINAMORNING POST (H.K.), Nov. 23, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1363094/li-fei-offers-more-ques-
tions-answers. For the consultation document, see H.K. GOV’T, LET’S TALK AND
ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE (2013) [hereinafter 2013 CONSULTATION
DOCUMENT].
25. People’s Lack of Confidence in HK’s Future, People’s Lack of Confidence
in China’s Future and People’s Lack of Confidence in “One Country, Two Sys-
tems” (Monthly Average), HKU POP SITE, http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/popex-
press/trust/conhkfuture/combine_no/datatables.html (last visited Jan. 10,
2014).
26. See discussion of “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” infra Part I.I.1.
27. See, e.g., Lauren Hilgers, Hong Kong’s Umbrella Revolution Isn’t Over
Yet, N.Y. TIMESMAG., Feb. 18, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/22/mag-
azine/hong-kongs-umbrella-revolution-isnt-over-yet.html.
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Although there has been extensive discussion since 1984 of
Hong Kong’s post-1997 constitutional order,28 there has been
relatively little discussion outside of Hong Kong legal academia
regarding the impact of events after 1997.29 Even within Hong
Kong legal academia, discussion of recent milestones in electoral
reform has been limited.30 This paper brings the academic dis-
cussion of post-1997 Hong Kong up to date in light of develop-
ments during 2013 and the first three quarters of 2014, with lim-
ited consideration of the Umbrella Movement and its aftermath.
It also examines the PRC’s public international law obligations
with respect to Hong Kong specifically.
Part I sets out the background to the resumption of Chinese
sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997. It posits that China laid
the foundations for its later defaults on democratization as early
as 1972, when it requested Hong Kong’s removal from the
United Nations’ list of Non-Self-Governing Territories. 31 The
British policy of acquiescence during the 1980s aided and abet-
ted future Chinese backsliding.32 Newfound and belated British
assertiveness in the 1990s was insufficient to undo the damage
done by years of British appeasement.33 Part I then provides an
account of Beijing’s attempts to undermine democratic reform in
Hong Kong from 2003 to date, culminating in the current round
of debates regarding Chief Executive electoral reforms for 2017.
After the NPCSC usurped the power to initiate electoral reform
in Hong Kong in 2004,34 it pledged in 2007 that Hong Kong could
28. See, e.g., Thomas Boasberg, One Country, One-and-a-Half Systems: The
Hong Kong Basic Law and Its Breaches of the Sino-British Joint Declaration,
10 WIS. INT’L L.J. 282 (1991); Nancy C. Jackson, The Legal Regime of Hong
Kong After 1997: An Examination of the Joint Declaration of the United King-
dom and the People’s Republic of China, 5 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 377 (1987).
29. See, e.g., BRUCE HERSCHENSOHN, HONG KONG AT THE HANDOVER (2000);
RALF HORLEMANN, HONG KONG’S TRANSITION TO CHINESE RULE: THE LIMITS OF
AUTONOMY (2002).
30. See, e.g., Albert H.Y. Chen,Hong Kong’s Constitutional Moment of 2014,
43 H.K. L.J. 791 (2013).
31. YASH GHAI, HONG KONG’S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: THE
RESUMPTION OFCHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THEBASIC LAW 11, 38 (2d ed. 1999);
see also Boasberg, supra note 28, at 288–89.
32. See 英鴿派當道談判節節敗退 [British Doves Prevailed, Repeatedly Re-
treated in Negotiations], MINGPAO (H.K.), Jan. 4, 2014.
33. See infra Part I.D.
34. See infra Part I.E.
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elect its own Chief Executive through universal suffrage in
2017.35 Yet Beijing remains adamant on maintaining a power of
veto by controlling the nomination process.36
Part II considers the applicable international legal framework.
It contends that any attempt by Beijing to impose political crite-
ria on Chief Executive candidacy violates obligations imposed by
the Joint Declaration, the ICCPR, and customary international
law. First, the object and purpose of the Joint Declaration, the
PRC’s subsequent practice in promulgating the Basic Law, and
other rules of treaty interpretation suggest that Beijing may not
render the Joint Declaration’s references to “elections” nugatory.
Second, the provisions of the ICCPR requiring universal suf-
frage, equal suffrage, and the right to be elected regardless of
political affiliation apply with full force to Hong Kong, despite
insistence by pre-1997 and post-1997 Hong Kong Governments
that they do not. The latter position is inconsistent with the Hu-
man Rights Committee’s conclusions, established rules of treaty
interpretation, and emergent rules of customary international
law. Third, although customary international law does not sup-
port a right to democracy per se, it arguably supports a principle
of “democratic teleology” or a right to democratization.
Part III considers possible remedies and means of enforce-
ment. In the absence of compulsory jurisdiction by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (“ICJ”) or of individual communications
under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, the options for enforc-
ing the PRC’s international law obligations are limited. Yet al-
ternatives remain available. Unilateral monitoring by the
United Kingdom, the prospect of a General Assembly request for
an Advisory Opinion, or conduct by third States, provide possi-
ble—if unlikely—means of enforcement. Ultimately, the most ef-
fective means of exerting pressure on the PRC to abide by its
international law obligations may not involve State actors. It
may not even involve public international law at all. However,
China’s increasing hostility toward democracy and “universal
values”37 warrants pessimism toward the prospects of democra-
tization in Hong Kong.
35. See infra Part I.F.
36. See infra Part I.I.
37. Document No. 9, an internal memorandum issued by the Chinese Com-
munist Party in 2013, declared that “constitutional democracy,” “universal val-
ues,” human rights, and other “Western” ideas were subversive and should be
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I. BACKGROUND ANDHISTORY
Beijing’s attempts to stymie Hong Kong’s democratization be-
gan well before 1997. These efforts continued after the signing
of the Joint Declaration and intensified after the transfer of sov-
ereignty, especially after landmark protests in 2003 against na-
tional security legislation. Between 2003 and 2010, Beijing
seized the power to initiate democratic reform in Hong Kong, de-
layed democratization until 2017 at the earliest, and created
schisms within the pro-democracy camp. Despite these efforts,
demand for democratization continued to build. The debacle sur-
rounding the Chief Executive selection process in 2012 provided
further impetus for reform. Despite—or perhaps because of—the
growing clamor for reforms, the 2014 Decision entrenched Bei-
jing’s stranglehold over the nomination of candidates for Chief
Executive.
A. The United Kingdom’s Acquisition of Hong Kong
The United Kingdom acquired control over Hong Kong
through three treaties with China during the nineteenth cen-
tury. As part of the settlement of the First Opium War, China
ceded the island of Hong Kong to the United Kingdom in perpe-
tuity in 1842, under the Treaty of Nanking.38 China ceded the
Kowloon Peninsula under the First Convention of Peking of 1860
at the conclusion of the Second Opium War.39 Under the third
treaty, the Second Convention of Peking of 1898, China granted
the United Kingdom a ninety-nine-year lease over the New Ter-
ritories and Outlying Islands.40
eliminated. Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation: How Much is a Hardline
Party Directive Shaping China’s Current Political Climate?, CHINAFILE (Nov.
8, 2013), http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation [hereinaf-
ter Document 9]. For more recent developments, see generally Samuel Wade,
Unraveling China’s Campaign Against Western Values, CHINA DIGITAL TIMES
(Mar. 5, 2015, 11:42 PM), http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/03/unraveling-chi-
nas-campaign-western-values/.
38. GHAI, supra note 31, at 4.
39. Id. at 4–5.
40. Id. at 5–6.
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Successive Chinese governments harbored resentment over
the treaties on Hong Kong,41 but no Chinese government at-
tempted to recover Hong Kong until 1982.42 Prior to 1982, the
PRC maintained that the treaties imposed on China in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries were void as unequal trea-
ties, but that it would recover Hong Kong at an appropriate
time.43 Pursuant to that stance, the PRC successfully sought the
removal of Hong Kong from the United Nations’ list of Non-Self-
Governing Territories in 1972.44
B. Background to the Joint Declaration
By the early 1980s, the looming end of the British lease over
the New Territories forced the British government to enter talks
with Beijing over the future of Hong Kong.45 China also found it
expedient to negotiate. In 1978, the PRC secretly established the
Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office (“HKMAO”); 46 by 1979
Deng Xiaoping had become General Secretary of the Communist
Party of China.47 The recovery of Hong Kong would not only pre-
serve face for China; it would also aid China’s economic develop-
ment and damage Deng’s hard-line rivals in Beijing.48
The Chinese were determined to regain sovereignty over Hong
Kong at all costs.49 The British soon discovered the extent of that
determination; Deng reacted angrily to Thatcher’s claim that the
treaties regarding Hong Kong remained valid.50 The PRC fur-
ther strengthened its bargaining position by threatening a uni-
lateral declaration of its policies toward Hong Kong after 1997.51
Faced with an obdurate Chinese negotiating position, the Brit-
41. Id. at 9.
42. Boasberg, supra note 28, at 287–89.
43. Id. at 288–89.
44. GHAI, supra note 31, at 11, 38; Boasberg, supra note 28, at 288–89.
45. GHAI, supra note 31, at 36–38; Boasberg, supra note 28, at 289.
46. GHAI, supra note 31, at 37.
47. Boasberg, supra note 28, at 289.
48. GHAI, supra note 31, at 37.
49. Id. at 47; Boasberg, supra note 28, at 290–91.
50. GHAI, supra note 31, at 47.
51. Id. at 48–49; Boasberg, supra note 28, at 290.
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ish abandoned their proposal to exchange sovereignty for admin-
istrative rights in late 1983.52 Chinese proposals provided the
basis for further negotiations.53
China’s plan for Hong Kong rested on the concept of “One
Country, Two Systems,” under which Hong Kong would be ruled
by Beijing but allowed to retain its capitalist economy. Deng
promised that post-1997 Hong Kong would have a “high degree
of autonomy” (高度自治) and that “Hong Kong people will rule
Hong Kong” (港人治港).54 Beijing encapsulated this policy in
twelve points, which were presented to the United Kingdom on
June 27, 1984.55 These points included guarantees that:
(1) Hong Kong would not be run by Beijing’s plenipo-
tentiaries;
(2) Hong Kong would have a “mayor” elected by Hong
Kong inhabitants, who should be a “patriot”;
(3) Except in matters of foreign affairs and defense,
Beijing would not interfere in Hong Kong’s governance;
and
(4) The PRC would tolerate political activities in Hong
Kong, provided they did not constitute sabotage.56
Deng hoped that “One Country, Two Systems” held the key to
resolving the questions of Hong Kong and Macau—and, ulti-
mately, to reunification with Taiwan.57 To that end, the PRC’s
1982 Constitution (promulgated as part of Deng’s comprehen-
sive reforms) included a provision allowing the creation of SARs,
with systems of government to be prescribed by the National
People’s Congress (“NPC”) “in the light of the specific condi-
tions.”58
52. Boasberg, supra note 28, at 294; GHAI, supra note 31, at 47–48. See also
英鴿派當道談判節節敗退 [British Doves Prevailed, Repeatedly Retreated in Ne-
gotiations], supra note 31 and accompanying text.
53. GHAI, supra note 31, at 46, 48–50.
54. Boasberg, supra note 28, at 291.
55. GHAI, supra note 31, at 49–50.
56. Id. at 49–50.
57. Boasberg, supra note 28, at 291; Jackson, supra note 28, at 422.
58. XIANFA art. 31 (1982) (China).
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China had initially been reluctant to enter into a binding
treaty on the future of Hong Kong, although Deng ultimately re-
lented.59 The Joint Declaration was initialed on September 24,
1984 and came into force on May 27, 1985.60 It was registered
with the United Nations on June 12, 1985.61
C. The Drafting of the Basic Law62
Following ratification of the Joint Declaration, the PRC set up
the Basic Law Drafting Committee (“Drafting Committee”). The
Drafting Committee consisted of fifty-nine members from Hong
Kong andMainland China, with Mainland members forming the
majority.63 The Drafting Committee was aided by a Basic Law
Consultative Committee (“Consultative Committee”), ostensibly
intended to introduce a degree of public participation. 64 The
United Kingdom played a minimal role in the drafting process;65
it had agreed not to engage in any constitutional reforms that
would be inconsistent with the Basic Law, a policy referred to as
“convergence.”66 The drafting process ultimately became an at-
tempt by a minority of liberal-minded Drafting Committee mem-
bers to prevent erosion of Chinese commitments in the Joint
Declaration.67 With respect to democracy, they achieved only
59. GHAI, supra note 31, at 53.
60. Id. at 55–56.
61. Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, China-U.K., Dec. 19,
1984, 1399 U.N.T.S. 33 [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
62. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Jibenfa
[Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by Order No.26, Pres. of China, Apr. 4, 1990,
effective Jul. 1, 1997) [hereinafter Basic Law or BL].
63. GHAI, supra note 31, at 57.
64. Id. at 58–59. The Consultative Committee’s Secretary-General was C.Y.
Leung, who would become Hong Kong’s third Chief Executive in 2012. Colleen
Lee, Ex-Communist Raps Comrade C.Y., S. CHINAMORNING POST (H.K.), Mar.
19, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/article/995884/ex-communist-raps-comrade-
cy.
65. See GHAI, supra note 31, at 59–60.
66. Id. at 59–60; Davis, supra note 15, at 170. The practical consequence—
and, indeed, the intent—of “convergence” was to “contain the pace of political
reform.”CHRISTOPHERPATTEN, EAST ANDWEST: CHINA, POWER,ANDTHEFUTURE
OF ASIA 25 (1998).
67. Davis, supra note 15, at 162.
2015] HONG KONG AND DEMOCRACY 479
limited success, especially after the Tiananmen Square Massa-
cre of 1989.68
The provisions governing Hong Kong’s political system were
particularly contentious.69 Pro-Beijing conservatives sought to
limit direct elections of the legislature and to have the Chief Ex-
ecutive selected through an electoral college.70 Pro-democracy
liberals sought the election of both the legislature and the Chief
Executive through universal suffrage. 71 The conservatives—
with Beijing’s blessing—ultimately won the argument.72
The process of negotiating the Joint Declaration—and, to a
lesser extent, the drafting process of the Basic Law—was re-
markable for its lack of representation of the interests of the
Hong Kong public. When then-Governor Sir Edward Youde de-
clared in 1982 that he represented the interests of Hong Kong,
the PRC Foreign Ministry responded that Youde could only be
present as a representative of the United Kingdom.73 During the
drafting of the Basic Law, attempts by the Hong Kong public to
make their views known had little impact on the Drafting Com-
mittee.74 Chinese attitudes hardened further after the Tianan-
men Square Massacre as hardliners consolidated their posi-
tion;75 by the end of the drafting process, Beijing was “increas-
ingly dictating the terms of the Basic Law.”76
D. 1990-1997: A Day Late and a Dollar Short
The administration of Hong Kong between 1984 and 1997
raised thorny difficulties, even before 1989. The United King-
dom purported to retain administrative authority over Hong
Kong.77 Yet the PRC also claimed an interest in the prosperity
and stability of the Crown Colony.78 A smooth transition would
only have been possible with the full cooperation of the United
68. Id. at 162–63.
69. GHAI, supra note 31, at 63.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. STEVE TSANG, A MODERNHISTORY OFHONGKONG 222 (2007).
74. GHAI, supra note 31, at 60–61.
75. Id. at 60.
76. Id. at 61.
77. Id. at 75.
78. Id.
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Kingdom and PRC and of Hong Kong’s domestic institutions.79
Instead, the two sovereigns began jockeying for power almost
immediately.80
The United Kingdom made an early push for Hong Kong’s de-
mocratization in 1984 in a consultation document (a “Green Pa-
per”) that contained detailed proposals for a Parliamentary de-
mocracy;81 however, the Green Paper fell victim to the United
Kingdom’s policy of “convergence.”82
The United Kingdom would come to regret its policy of ap-
peasement. The bloody suppression of the 1989 democracy move-
ment shattered the Hong Kong public’s confidence in Beijing,
prompting mass emigration during the 1990s.83 London came
under pressure—both from Hong Kong and internationally—to
hasten democratization and protect rights and freedoms;84 for its
part, Beijing fought British attempts at political reform at every
turn. 85 The Memorandum of Understanding on Hong Kong’s
new airport, signed in 1991, also prompted the United Kingdom
to reconsider its concessions to China.86 The British negotiating
position would harden after 1991, but this would have little ef-
fect in securing greater Chinese commitment to Hong Kong’s de-
mocratization.
79. Id. at 73.
80. See id. at 75.
81. See id. at 76.
82. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. See also GHAI, supra note 31,
at 76.
83. See Sebastian Veg, Hong Kong’s Enduring Identity Crisis, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 16, 2013, 3:26 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/china/ar-
chive/2013/10/hong-kongs-enduring-identity-crisis/280622/.
84. GHAI, supra note 31, at 76.
85. Id.
86. The Memorandum of Understanding imposed various substantive and
procedural requirements on the construction of the new Hong Kong Interna-
tional Airport, the effect of which was to require consultation or consent of the
PRC and to dictate the Hong Kong treasury’s fiscal reserves. The Memoran-
dum also established an Airport Committee under the Joint Liaison Group (the
latter being a creation of the Joint Declaration); the Airport Committee oper-
ated in secret, setting “a bad precedent for public participation, policy making
and accountability.” GHAI, supra note 31, at 77. See also Alvin Y. So, The
Tiananmen Incident, Patten’s Electoral Reforms, and the Roots of Contested
Democracy in Hong Kong, in THE CHALLENGE OFHONGKONG’S REINTEGRATION
WITHCHINA 49, 61–62 (Ming K. Chan ed., 1997).
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The most prominent symbol of the United Kingdom’s new-
found assertiveness was the appointment of Chris Patten, a sen-
ior Conservative politician, as Hong Kong’s last governor in
1992.87 In October 1992, without consulting Beijing, Patten an-
nounced Legco electoral reforms for 1995, which, although con-
forming to the letter of the Basic Law, hastened the pace of de-
mocratization.88 Beijing’s reaction was vituperative.89 After sev-
enteen rounds of talks, Sino-British negotiations failed;90 Legco
passed Patten’s reform package substantially unchanged.
Following the passage of the Patten reforms, Beijing went its
own way. It declared that the “through train” arrangement, un-
der which legislators elected in 1995 could remain in office until
1999, had been derailed.91 It also hastened arrangements for its
own shadow government, the Preliminary Working Committee
(PWC),92 and created a “provisional legislature”—a creature for-
eign to the Basic Law.93 The deterioration of Sino-British rela-
tions after 1989 thus resulted in two tracks of government, with
each track intent on undoing the reforms instituted by the other.
This pattern of Chinese recalcitrance was an ominous sign of
things to come. It showed, to many, a “cavalier attitude towards
the Basic Law.”94 Subsequent events would prove the skeptics
correct.
E. 2003-2004: Beijing Usurps Initiative
On July 1, 2003, an estimated 500,000 people marched in pro-
test against proposed national security legislation.95 Demands
87. See GHAI, supra note 31, at 78.
88. See So, supra note 86, at 63–64; see also GHAI, supra note 31, at 78.
89. Then-HKMAO chief, Lu Ping (魯平), castigated Patten as a “sinner of
the ages.” See Tony Cheung, Last Governor Chris Patten Speaks of ‘Regrets’
Over Hong Kong Democracy, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), Nov. 12, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1353799/last-governor-chris-
patten-speaks-regrets-over-hong-kong-democracy.
90. See So, supra note 86, at 65–67.
91. See So, supra note 86, at 67–68; see also GHAI, supra note 31, at 75–78.
92. So, supra note 86, at 67–68.
93. GHAI, supra note 31, at 78. The creation of the Provisional Legislature
will be revisited at the end of this paper.
94. Id.
95. Rebellion: Forcing a Backdown over Hong Kong’s New Internal-Security
Law Could Be Only the Beginning, ECONOMIST, Jul. 10, 2003, http://www.econ-
omist.com/node/1908260.
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for democratization followed. Advocates of democracy, fortified
by high protest turnout, called for the election of the Chief Exec-
utive by universal suffrage in 2007. They also demanded the
abolition of “functional constituency” legislators, who made up
half of Legco and entrenched the influence of business and pro-
fessional interests, by 2008.96
The Beijing and Hong Kong Governments swiftly moved to
dominate all subsequent discussion.97 On January 7, 2004, then-
Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa (董建華) announced the crea-
tion of a Constitutional Development Task Force headed by Sir
Donald Tsang Yam-kuen (曾蔭權), then-Chief Secretary,98 to
consult the Central People’s Government (“Central Govern-
ment”) on constitutional development. Tsang explained the need
to consult Beijing in the following terms:
Taking into consideration our duty to uphold the Basic Law, as
well as political reality, we believe that we need to first initiate
discussions with the central authorities before determining the
appropriate arrangements for the constitutional review . . . At
the most basic level, this will avoid the central authorities and
the Hong Kong community reaching different understandings
of those Basic Law provisions regarding constitutional devel-
opment. Such a scenario could cause serious confrontation be-
tween the Hong Kong community and our sovereign govern-
ment. Obviously, we do not want to precipitate such a situa-
tion.99
On the same day, the HKMAO – an arm of the Beijing govern-
ment – issued a press release emphasizing Hong Kong’s political
development related to the implementation of “One Country,
Two Systems” and to the relationship between the Central Gov-
ernment and the Hong Kong SAR.100
96. Boasberg, supra note 28, at 331–32; GHAI, supra note 31, at 259–61; see
Albert H.Y. Chen, The Constitutional Controversy of Spring 2004, 34 H.K. L.J.
215, 215-16 (2004) [hereinafter Chen, Constitutional Controversy]. For a de-
tailed explanation of functional constituencies, see YOUNG & LAW, supra note
23. See also infra Part II.D.
97. Chen, Constitutional Controversy, supra note 96 at 216.
98. Second in line only to the Chief Executive in Hong Kong’s executive hi-
erarchy.
99. Press Release, H.K. Gov’t, Task Force to Study Constitutional Review
(Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://archive.news.gov.hk/isd/ebulletin/en/cate-
gory/administration/040107/html/040107en01003.htm.
100. Chen, Constitutional Controversy, supra note 96 at 216.
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Beijing would soon dictate its views on democratic develop-
ment to Hong Kong. On March 26, 2004, the NPCSC announced
that it would consider issuing an interpretation of the Basic Law
provisions governing Hong Kong’s political development at its
next meeting.101 The deliberations were brief. On April 6, 2004,
the NPCSC delivered its interpretation of Annexes I and II of
the Basic Law (the “2004 Interpretation”).102 The 2004 Interpre-
tation required the Chief Executive to report to the NPCSC on
the necessity of political reform, after which the NPCSC would
determine whether such reform was indeed necessary.103 The
NPCSC thus seized the political initiative for electoral reform.104
The Chief Executive obligingly submitted a report, stating that
there was a need to amend the electoral arrangements for 2007
and 2008, but that “development towards the ultimate aim of
universal suffrage must progress in a gradual and orderly man-
ner step by step. The pace should not be too fast.”105 Armed with
the Chief Executive’s reservations, the NPCSC ruled out univer-
sal suffrage in 2007 and 2008 in its Decision of April 26, 2004
(the “2004 Decision”).106 A public relations offensive followed the
101. SOW KEAT TOK, MANAGING CHINA’S SOVEREIGNTY IN HONG KONG AND
TAIWAN 124 (2013).
102. Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Zhong-
hua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Jibenfa Fujian Yi Di
Qi Tiao He Fujian Er Di San Tiao de Jieshi
(全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法》附
件一第七條和附件二第三條的解釋) [Interpretation by the Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of An-
nex II to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People’s Republic of China] (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Apr. 6, 2004), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2004-
07/23/content_332218.htm [hereinafter 2004 Interpretation].
103. Chen, Constitutional Controversy, supra note 96 at 218.
104. Id.
105. H.K. CHIEF EXEC., REPORT ONWHETHER THERE IS ANEED TO AMEND THE
METHODS FOR SELECTING THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVEREGION IN 2007 AND FORFORMING THELEGISLATIVECOUNCIL OF
THEHONGKONGSPECIALADMINISTRATIVEREGION IN 2008, at 4 (2004), available
at http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/index.html (select “Instrument
19”).
106. Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Xiang-
gang Tebie Xingzhengqu 2007 Nian Xingzheng Zhangguan he 2008 Nian Lifa
Hui Chansheng Banfa Youguan Wenti de Jueding (全國人民代表大會常務委員
會關於香港特別行政區 2007 年行政長官和 2008 年立法會產生辦法有關問題的決
定) [Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on
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legal offensive. Between 2004 and 2005, Beijing officials and
their Hong Kong supporters let loose a “barrage” of hostility to-
ward advocates of democratization.107
F. 2007: Jam Tomorrow
In March 2007, twenty-one pro-democracy legislators pre-
sented their proposal for electoral reform in 2012. Under this
proposal, all legislators would be elected through direct elec-
tions, putting an end to functional constituencies. The Chief Ex-
ecutive would be elected by universal suffrage from a list of can-
didates nominated by at least fifty members of a 1200-strong
nominating committee.108 The reform proposal became a key is-
sue in the 2007 debates between Donald Tsang—by then run-
ning for re-election as Chief Executive—and Alan Leong Ka-kit
(梁家傑), the pro-democracy candidate. Confronted with contin-
ued public demand for democratization, Tsang pledged that he
would pursue a timetable for democratization if he were re-
elected.109 Tsang was duly re-elected; throughout April and May
2007, democrats pressed Tsang to abide by his promise of a time-
table for reform.110
Beijing reacted quickly. On June 6, 2007, Tsang was sum-
moned before NPC President Wu Bangguo (吳邦國), who de-
clared that the SAR had no “residual power” to decide on politi-
cal reforms.111 On December 29, the NPCSC handed down its
2007 Decision—ruling out universal suffrage for any elections in
2012.112 The earliest possible date for Chief Executive elections
by universal suffrage, the NPCSC declared, was 2017—twenty
Issues Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2007 and for Forming the Leg-
islative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year
2008] (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 26, 2004),
available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2004-07/23/content_332215.htm
[hereinafter 2004 Decision]. See alsoMichael C. Davis, The Basic Law and De-
mocratization in Hong Kong, 3 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 165, 166–67 (2005).
107. Davis, supra note 106, at 172–75.
108. Baohui Zhang, Beijing’s 2007 Political Reform Plan and Prospects for
Hong Kong’s Democratization, 17 DEMOCRATIZATION 442, 447 (2010).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 448.
112. 2007 Decision, supra note 18.
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years after the establishment of the SAR and more than thirty
years after the signing of the Joint Declaration.113
G. 2009-2010: Divide and Conquer
The first clash over electoral reform after the 2007 Decision
began in November 2009, when the Hong Kong Government re-
leased its “Consultation Document on the Methods for Selecting
the Chief Executive and for Forming the Legislative Council in
2012” (the “2009 Proposals”).114 Under the 2009 Proposals, the
Election Committee would swell in numbers to 1200 people, but
its basic contours would remain unchanged.115 The number of
Legco seats would increase from sixty to seventy, with five new
geographical constituency and five new functional constituency
seats.116 The new functional constituency seats would be chosen
by elected members of District Councils (local consultative as-
semblies).117
Pro-democracy politicians criticized the 2009 Proposals for
their lack of ambition, but became bitterly divided over how to
react.118 Legislators from the League of Social Democrats (社會
民主連線, also known as 社民連; “LSD”) and the Civic Party (公
民黨; “CP”) resigned in an attempt to trigger a “de facto referen-
dum” on democratic reform. However, their efforts were ham-
strung by the refusal of the Democratic Party of Hong Kong (民
113. Id.
114. H.K. CONST. ANDMAINLAND AFF. BUREAU, CONSULTATION DOCUMENT ON
THE METHODS FOR SELECTING THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND FOR FORMING THE
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL IN 2012 (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.cmab-
cd2012.gov.hk/doc/consultation_document_en.pdf [hereinafter 2009
CONSULTATIONDOCUMENT]. See also Albert H.Y. Chen, Constitutional Develop-
ments in Autumn 2009, 39 H.K.L.J. 751, 759–66 (2009) [hereinafter Chen, Con-
stitutional Developments].
115. 2009 CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 114, ¶¶ 4.07, 4.13. See also
Chen, Constitutional Developments, supra note 114, at 761–62.
116. 2009 CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 114, ¶ 5.06. See also Chen,
Constitutional Developments, supra note 114, at 761.
117. 2009 CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 114, ¶ 5.13. See also Chen,
Constitutional Developments, supra note 114, at 761, 764.
118. Chen, Constitutional Developments, supra note 114, at 764–65; Albert
H.Y. Chen, An Unexpected Breakthrough in Hong Kong’s Constitutional Re-
form, 40 H.K. L.J. 259, 259–60 (2010) [hereinafter Chen, Unexpected Break-
through].
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主黨 ; “Democratic Party”)—then Hong Kong’s largest pro-de-
mocracy party—to participate.119 Instead, the Democratic Party
and other “moderate” democrats formed the Alliance for Univer-
sal Suffrage (終極普選聯盟) to negotiate with the Hong Kong and
Beijing Governments.120
Beijing adeptly exploited the divisions between “moderate”
and “radical” democrats. It strongly condemned the “de facto ref-
erendum”; pro-Beijing politicians boycotted the by-elections.121
Meanwhile, the Central Government’s Hong Kong liaison office
(the “Liaison Office”) hosted an unprecedented series of meet-
ings with “moderate” democrats.122 As a result of these talks, the
2009 Proposals received Legco approval in 2010, with minimal
modifications.123
The Democratic Party’s decisions to negotiate with Beijing and
to vote in favor of the revised 2009 Proposals provoked wide-
spread recriminations.124 Beset by criticism from other pro-de-
mocracy parties and accused by the public of betrayal, 125 the
party won only four out of thirty-five available Geographical
Constituency seats in the 2012 Legco elections.126 Its Faustian
pact not only split the pro-democracy parties into “moderate”
and “radical” camps; it also highlighted the steep political price
of advancing proposals deemed to be politically unambitious.
119. See Chen, Unexpected Breakthrough, supra note 118, at 259–60; Hong
KongMPs Quit in Attempt to Push Beijing Towards Direct Elections,GUARDIAN
(Jan. 26, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2010/jan/26/hong-kong-democracy-bid.
120. Chen, Unexpected Breakthrough, supra note 118, at 260.
121. Id. at 260–61.
122. Id. at 261.
123. Id. at 262–64. As with the original 2009 Proposals, elected District
Councilors would nominate candidates for the five new Functional Constitu-
ency seats. However, Hong Kong voters not already enrolled in an existing
Functional Constituency would choose among the nominated candidates. See
id. at 263.
124. See id. at 265.
125. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Evans, Pro-Democracy Parties Hold Protests in
Hong Kong, BBC NEWS (July 1, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10480116;
Suzanne Pepper, A Replay of 2010?, CHINAELECTIONS ANDGOVERNANCEBLOGS
(Sept. 4, 2013, 8:43 AM), http://chinaelectionsblog.net/hkfocus/?p=637.
126. Simon Lee,Hong Kong Democrat Leader Albert Ho to Resign on Election
Result, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 9, 2012, available at http://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/2012-09-10/hong-kong-democrat-leader-albert-ho-to-resign-on-
election-result.html.
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H. 2012: Playing Charades
The decline of “moderate” democrats was not the only factor to
shape subsequent political debate. The process by which C.Y.
Leung was selected to be Hong Kong’s third Chief Executive
threw a spotlight on the defects of the existing system of selec-
tion.127
Leung’s anointment ended a long, bruising campaign between
Leung (previously Convenor of the Executive Council, Hong
Kong’s cabinet) and Henry Tang Ying-yen (唐英年; previously
Chief Secretary). 128 Tang, originally the front-runner, 129 was
soon embroiled in scandals over marital infidelity and an unau-
thorized underground extension in his home.130 Leung, for his
part, was tarred with suggestions that he was an underground
member of the Communist Party131 and that he had proposed
the use of “riot police and tear gas” to quell protests in 2003.132
Members of the Election Committee alleged that the Liaison Of-
fice had openly urged them to support Leung.133 Others sought
to divine Beijing’s chosen candidate.134 By the final stages of the
127. The Economist described the process as “Byzantine” and “[b]orn of
China’s fear of leaders with a genuine electoral mandate” calculated to “cloak
a decision taken elsewhere in some semblance of popular consultation.” Hong
Kong’s Chief-Executive “Election”: The Worst System, Including All the Others,
supra note 22.
128. Albert Ho also ran, but had no prospect of success: Hong Kong Protests:
No Exit, ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2014, http://www.econo-
mist.com/news/china/21621846-days-student-led-unrest-hong-kong-are-crisis-
chinas-communist-party-no-exit.
129. Id.
130. Gary Cheung & Tanna Chong, C.Y. Leung Seeks Unity After Divisive
Poll, S. CHINAMORNING POST (H.K.), Mar. 26, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/arti-
cle/996589/cy-leung-seeks-unity-after-divisive-poll.
131. Lee, supra note 64.
132. Tanna Chong, Complaints Pour in Over Poll for Chief Executive, S.
CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), Mar. 29, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/arti-
cle/996959/complaints-pour-over-poll-chief-executive.
133. Id. See also Beijing Lobbies in Push for a Leung Victory, S. CHINA
MORNING POST (H.K.), Mar. 21, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/article/996111/bei-
jing-lobbies-push-leung-victory.
134. Tanna Chong & Peter So, Delegates Await Word of Beijing’s Thinking
on Race, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), Mar. 4, 2012,
http://www.scmp.com/article/994424/delegates-await-word-beijings-thinking-
race.
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race, some electors were considering whether to force a new elec-
tion by casting blank ballots.135
Meanwhile, attempts at introducing public opinion, if not par-
ticipation, were savaged. Hao Tiechuan (郝鐵川), propaganda
chief at the Liaison Office, suggested the regulation of opinion
polls, ostensibly to reduce partisan influence.136 Perhaps not sur-
prisingly, an electronic public mock election organized by the
University of Hong Kong came under sustained hacking attacks,
forcing voters to cast paper ballots.137
Leung’s selection did not end the controversy. Shortly after
winning the “election,” Leung made a ninety-minute visit to the
Liaison Office—three times as long as his meeting with outgoing
Chief Executive Donald Tsang—raising suspicions that the Li-
aison Office had intervened to secure Leung’s election. 138
Leung’s credibility suffered further damage when—ironically—
the press later discovered illegal structures at his own home.139
I. The Current Debate
Professor Albert Chen (陳弘毅), writing about the 2007 Deci-
sion, observed that “[i]t is . . . unlikely that the Decision will have
the effect of reducing significantly controversies regarding Hong
135. Vaudine England, Hong Kong Election: All Bets Off After Frontrunner’s
Calamitous Campaign, GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2012, 1:34 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/23/hong-kong-election.
136. Colleen Lee, Liaison Office Man Airs Pre-Election Polling Curbs, S.
CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), Mar. 22, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/arti-
cle/996230/liaison-office-man-airspre-election-polling-curbs.
137. Chi-fai Cheung, Pair Held Over Hacking of Mock Poll, S. CHINA
MORNING POST (H.K.), Mar. 26, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/arti-
cle/996598/pair-held-over-hacking-mock-poll.
138. Tanna Chong, Gary Cheung, & Colleen Lee, I Won’t Be a Yes Man, Says
Leung, S. CHINAMORNINGPOST (H.K.), Mar. 28, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/ar-
ticle/996786/i-wont-be-yes-man-says-leung.
139. Tony Cheung, Joshua But & Joyce Ng, Hong Kong Chief Executive Sur-
vives No Confidence Challenge, S. CHINAMORNING POST (H.K.), Dec. 13, 2012,
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1103900/hong-kong-chief-execu-
tive-survives-no-confidence-challenge.
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Kong’s political development.”140 That remark has proved pres-
cient.141 The NPCSC’s 2004 and 2007 Decisions delayed demo-
cratic elections for Chief Executive from 2007 to 2017. The sub-
sequent attempt by the Democratic Party to achieve compromise
on electoral reform in 2010 split the pro-democracy camp and
resulted in electoral defeat. The 2012 “election” of C.Y. Leung
again exposed the shortcomings of the existing method of selec-
tion. The effect of Beijing’s continued prevarication over elec-
toral reform was not the abandonment of demands for democ-
racy, but the intensification and radicalization of such de-
mands.142
1. 2013: The Moderates Lose Patience
Beijing’s interference with Hong Kong’s democratic develop-
ment had long been a source of public anger. The eruption of that
resentment in 2013 was nonetheless surprising, both in its
source and its ferocity. March 27 marked the debut of a social
movement called Occupy Central with Love and Peace (讓愛與和
平佔領中環, also known as 佔領中環; “Occupy Central”).143 A re-
action to growing frustration with Beijing’s continued opposition
to democracy in Hong Kong,144 the movement had three cardinal
principles. First, Hong Kong’s electoral system must comply
with international standards of universal suffrage—encompass-
ing the number of votes per person, the weight to be accorded to
each vote, and the right to stand for election.145 Second, concrete
proposals for reform should be decided through deliberation and
140. Albert H.Y. Chen, A New Era in Hong Kong’s Constitutional History, 38
H.K. L.J. 1, 11 (2008).
141. See Chen, Unexpected Breakthrough, supra note 118.
142. See, e.g., Langer, supra note 17.
143. “Central” refers to Hong Kong’s central business district.
144. See Benny Y.T. Tai, 公民抗命的最大殺傷力武器 [The Most Destructive
Weapon of Civil Disobedience], H.K. ECON. J., Jan. 16, 2013, available at
http://oclp.hk/index.php?route=occupy/article_detail&article_id=23, & Kin-
man Chan,讓愛與和平佔領中環 [Let Love and Peace Occupy Central], MINGPAO
(H.K.), Mar. 4, 2013, available at http://oclp.hk/index.php?route=occupy/arti-
cle_detail&article_id=19. See also Suzanne Pepper, The 2017 Reform Cam-
paign: First Draft Proposals, CHINA ELECTIONS AND GOVERNANCE BLOGS (Aug.
5, 2013, 5:41 AM), http://chinaelectionsblog.net/hkfocus/?p=631.
145. XINNIAN SHU, MANIFESTO: OCCUPY CENTRALWITH LOVE&PEACE (信念書
), available at http://oclp.hk/index.php?route=occupy/book_detail&book_id=11
(last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
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civic authorization.146 Third, any act of civil disobedience in the
struggle for universal suffrage must be nonviolent.147 The sub-
stantive proposals themselves would be decided in a series of De-
liberation Days.148
Occupy Central was not an isolated phenomenon. Six days ear-
lier, on March 21, twelve pro-democracy political groups formed
the Alliance for True Democracy (真普選聯盟; “ATD”) to garner
public support in the debate over political reform. 149 It, too,
called for universal and equal suffrage and rejected any “filter-
ing” of Chief Executive candidates.150
The concern shared by Occupy Central and the Alliance for
True Democracy—that Beijing would never allow truly demo-
cratic elections in Hong Kong—was not unfounded. On March
24, Qiao Xiaoyang (喬曉陽), Chairman of the NPC’s Law Com-
mittee, stated in a closed-door meeting that “chief executive can-
didates must be persons who love the country and love Hong
Kong, while the methods in the universal suffrage must match
with the Basic Law and the decisions by the [NPCSC].”151
Qiao maintained that it was the “clear and consistent” policy
of the Central Government that no person who “confronts” the
Central Government could become Chief Executive, citing Deng
Xiaoping’s statement that Hong Kongmust be run by people who
“love the motherland and Hong Kong.”152 Although Qiao admit-
ted “confronting the Central Government” could not be defined
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. The idea of Deliberation Day originated from BRUCEA. ACKERMAN&
JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATIONDAY (2004).
149. Joshua But, Pan-Democrats Unite for 2017 Vote, S.CHINAMORNINGPOST
(H.K.), Mar. 22, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/arti-
cle/1196604/pan-democrats-unite-genuine-universal-suffrage.
150. ALLIANCE FORTRUEDEMOCRACY,MANIFESTO (Mar. 21, 2013), available at
http://www.atd.hk/en/?page_id=10.
151. Joshua But & Colleen Lee, Opponents of Beijing Ineligible to be CE: Top
Chinese Official, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), Mar. 24, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/article/1199015/opposition-camp-members-cant-run-
chief-executive-says-npc-official?page=all.
152. Deng Xiaoping,One Country, Two Systems, PEOPLE’SDAILY (Jun. 22–23,
1984), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1210.html. Qiao did
not, however, cite Deng’s explanation of what he meant by a “patriot.” “A pa-
triot is one who respects the Chinese nation, sincerely supports the mother-
land’s resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong and wishes not to impair
Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability. Those who meet these requirements are
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with substantive criteria or written law, he insisted that the
Nominating Committee, the Hong Kong electorate, and the Cen-
tral Government should each decide whether a candidate met
that requirement. Most disturbingly for pro-democracy politi-
cians, he hinted that the Central Government’s patience had
limits and that no consultation on political reform could begin
unless they accepted that no “confrontational” candidate could
ever become Chief Executive.153
Pro-democracy politicians derided Qiao’s comments as paving
the way for a pre-selection mechanism inconsistent with univer-
sal suffrage.154 Audrey Eu Yuet-mee (余若薇) of the Civic Party
described Qiao’s speech as a “big con.”155 Beijing has done little
to assuage such concerns.156 Zhang Xiaoming (張曉明), head of
the Liaison Office, emphasized the need to eliminate politically
undesirable candidates. 157 Professor Albert Chen and Maria
TamWai-chu (譚惠珠), both members of the NPCSC’s Basic Law
patriots, whether they believe in capitalism or feudalism or even slavery. We
don’t demand that they be in favour of China’s socialist system; we only ask
them to love the motherland and Hong Kong.” Id.
153. Qiao, supra note 19.
154. 喬曉陽高調定底線 中央架空港府應戰泛民 [Qiao Xiaoyang’s High-Profile
Setting of a Bottom Line; Central Government Going Over the H.K. Govern-
ment’s Head to Fight Pan-Democrats], HOUSE NEWS (Mar. 25, 2013) (copy on
file with author).
155. Id.
156. Beijing has quite literally “stuck to its guns.” The People’s Liberation
Army (“PLA”) Hong Kong Garrison intensified its live-fire training shortly be-
fore July 1, 2013. 解放軍日夜操炮 居民煩爆 [PLA Firing Exercises Day and
Night Annoy Residents], APPLE DAILY (H.K.), Jun. 15, 2013, http://hk.ap-
ple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20130615/18298331. The Global Times—known
for its belligerent editorial views—raised the possibility of a PLA deployment
against Occupy Central.官媒：解放軍隨時應付佔中 [Official Media: PLA Ready
to Deal with Occupy Central], APPLEDAILY (H.K.), Sept. 23, 2013, http://hk.ap-
ple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20130923/18434574.
157. 張曉明以「筲箕」論特首篩選 堅決反對佔中 [Zhang Xiaoming Uses
“Sieve” as Metaphor for Eliminating Chief Executive Candidates, Adamantly
Opposes Occupy Central], H.K. ECON. J. FORUM, http://fo-
rum.hkej.com/node/103480 (last visited Sept. 28, 2013); 張曉明筲箕妙喻民主程
序 [Zhang Xiaoming Uses Sieve as Metaphor for Democratic Process], TAKUNG
PAO (H.K.), http://news.takungpao.com.hk/hkol/politics/2013-07/1766874.html
(last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
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Committee (“BLC”), have differed in their proposals for nomina-
tions—but both have assumed that the public will have no power
to make binding nominations.158
The pro-Beijing counter-mobilization continued over the sum-
mer and autumn of 2013. On August 8, the pro-Government
group “Silent Majority for Hong Kong” (幫港出聲) was set up,
with no clear agenda other than opposition to Occupy Central.159
The Hong Kong and Beijing Governments brusquely rebuffed
statements by the U.K. FCO and the U.S. Consul-General in
support of universal suffrage.160 Comments by Lord Patten of
Barnes (as Chris Patten had become) dismissing attempts at re-
sisting increased political freedom as “spitting in the wind” drew
harsh comments from the PRC Foreign Ministry and official me-
dia.161
Beijing continued to ratchet up its rhetoric in late 2013. In No-
vember 2013, Hong Kong media reported that former HKMAO
Deputy Director Chen Zuo-er (陳佐洱), known for his bellicose
Hong Kong policy, would set up a think-tank on Hong Kong and
Macau policy.162 In the same month, BLC Chairman Li Fei (李飛
158. Tony Cheung, Beijing Loyalists Split on Picking Top Job Hopefuls, S.
CHINAMORNING POST (H.K.), Sept. 21, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-
kong/article/1314061/beijing-loyalists-split-picking-top-job-hopefuls.
159. See Tony Cheung, Silent Majority for Hong Kong Takes on Occupy Cen-
tral in Campaign ‘to Protect City’s Interests’, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.),
Aug. 9, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1295407/speaking-
silent-majority. The link between the phrase “silent majority” and Richard
Nixon’s divisive electoral strategy appears to have been lost on the organizers
of “SMHK.” See WILLIAM H. CHAFE, PRIVATE LIVES/PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES:
PERSONALITY AND POLITICS INMODERNAMERICA, 263–64 (2009).
160. See supra Introduction.
161. Patten Under Fire for Interfering, STANDARD (H.K.), Nov. 14, 2013,
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_de-
tail.asp?we_cat=4&art_id=139580&sid=40882515&con_type=1&d_str=20131
114&fc=7; Zhang Dinghuai, Patten’s Interference Finds Little Audience,
GLOBAL TIMES, Nov. 21, 2013, http://www.globaltimes.cn/con-
tent/826788.shtml. For a summary of the interview, see Natasha Brereton-Fu-
kui, Hong Kong Ex-Governor: To Resist Elections Is ‘Spitting in The Wind’,
CHINA REAL TIME (Nov. 11, 2013, 3:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/china-
realtime/2013/11/11/former-governor-hong-kong-independence-vital-to-terri-
tory-china/.
162. See陳佐洱出山組超級智囊團 [Chen Zuo-er Emerges From Retirement to
Form Super Think-Tank], SING TAO DAILY (H.K.), Nov. 11, 2013,
http://std.stheadline.com/yesterday/loc/1126ao01.html. See also 星島：陳佐洱
辦智庫研港政改劉兆佳任副會長 [Sing Tao: Chen Zuo-er to Form Think-Tank on
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) emphasized, during a high-profile visit to Hong Kong, that the
power to nominate rested in a Nominating Committee and that
the post of Chief Executive “must be taken up by a person who
loves the country as well as Hong Kong.”163
Beijing’s increasingly bombastic tone put the Hong Kong Gov-
ernment in an invidious position. Yet the latter did little to lower
the political temperature. It released its consultation document
on 2017 electoral reform in December 2013, 164 amidst wide-
spread suspicion that the consultation was purely cosmetic.165
The consultation document quoted extensively from speeches by
Mainland officials, prompting allegations that the Hong Kong
Government treated the speeches as “holy orders.”166 It was also
replete with leading questions regarding the composition of the
Nominating Committee.167 Yet the document made no reference
to the ICCPR, Article 39 of the Basic Law, or the Bill of Rights
Ordinance (transposing part of the ICCPR into Hong Kong
Hong Kong Political Reforms; Lau Siu-Kai to be Vice-Chairman], HOUSENEWS
(Nov. 26, 2013) (copy on file with author).
163. Tony Cheung & Tanna Chong, Catch-22 Situation Looms Over Election
for Chief Executive in 2017, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), Nov. 22, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1363262/catch-22-situation-
looms-over-election-chief-executive-2017. See also Jeffie Lam, Top Beijing
Basic Law Official Dashes Hopes of Pan-Democrats, S. CHINA MORNING POST
(H.K.), Nov. 23, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/arti-
cle/1364088/top-beijing-basic-law-official-dashes-hopes-pan-democrats.
164. 2013 CONSULTATIONDOCUMENT, supra note 24.
165. See Chong & Lau, supra note 24; see also Chong & Cheung, supra note
24.
166. See, e.g., Au Nok-hin,京官是聖旨的政改諮詢 [A Political Reform Consul-
tation Where Beijing’s Officials Dictate Holy Orders], MINGPAO (H.K.), Dec. 6,
2013. Hong Kong 2020 (a think-tank headed by former Chief Secretary Anson
Chan) and the pro-democracy Civic Party have issued a joint report with ex-
tensive criticisms of the consultation document. See CIVICPARTY&HONGKONG
2020, FINDING THE RIGHT PATH TO UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE: WHAT THE
GOVERNMENT IS NOT TELLING YOU (2014). 陳太公民黨聯手 轟政改諮詢六倒退
[Anson Chan and Civic Party Join Hands, Blast Consultation’s Six Instances
of Back-Sliding], MINGPAO (H.K.), Jan. 7, 2014. Contra, 指喬曉陽言論提供參考
袁國強：非法律框架解說 [Qiao Xiaoyang’s Comments for Reference Only; (Sec-
retary for Justice) Rimsky Yuen: Not Explanation of Legal Framework],
MINGPAO (H.K.), Jan. 7, 2014.
167. 2013CONSULTATIONDOCUMENT, supra note 24, ch. 5, ¶¶ 5.01–.05, at 38–
39.
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law).168 Worse still, it avoided the elephant in the room—what
the phrase “loving the country and loving Hong Kong” actually
meant. The explanation by Chief Secretary Carrie Lam Cheng
Yuet-ngor (林鄭月娥)—that the meaning of the phrase was “self-
evident”—did nothing to dispel public suspicions.169 Nor did the
Government’s dismissal of a public poll commissioned by Occupy
Central and conducted by the Hong Kong University Public
Opinion Program.170 The fact that the then-Chairman of the
Hong Kong Bar Association warned the Hong Kong Government
against presenting political objections to reform proposals as le-
gal objections illustrates the extent to which the latter was sus-
pected of whitewashing.171
2. 2014: Beijing’s Gloves Come Off; Hong Kong’s Umbrellas
Come Out
As 2013 gave way to 2014, Beijing’s hardline stance showed no
signs of abating. On January 9, 2014, Hao Tiechuan declared
that the Central Government would declare a state of emergency
if events in Hong Kong went “out of control,” presumably a
threat directed at Occupy Central.172 On March 6, 2014, Zhang
Dejiang (張德江), Chairman of the NPC, declared that any per-
son selected for Chief Executive would have to “love the country
168. See FINDING THE RIGHT PATH TO UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE, supra note 166,
ch. 2, ¶¶ 2.02–03.
169. 愛國被指不言而喻 [Patriotism Described as Self-Evident], APPLE DAILY
(H.K.), Dec. 5, 2013. See also But, supra note 149.
170. 林鄭：元旦投票無大參考幫助 [Carrie Lam: New Year’s Poll Has Little
Evidential Value], MINGPAO (H.K.), Jan. 3, 2014. More than 90 percent of the
62,000 people surveyed rejected “pre-screening” by Beijing. Michelle Yun,
Hong Kong Survey Shows Most People Want Open Elections in 2017,
BLOOMBERG, Jan. 1, 2014, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-
01-02/hong-kong-survey-shows-most-people-want-open-elections-in-
2017.html.
171. Paul Shieh S.C., Chairman of the H.K. Bar Ass’n, Speech at the Opening
of the Legal Year 2014 (Jan. 13, 2014), http://hkba.org/whatsnew/chairman-
corner/speeches/2014/Speech%20for%20the%20Opening%20of%20the%20Le-
gal%20Year%202014%20-%20webpage%20(E).pdf.
172. 郝鐵川：中央可宣佈香港緊急狀態 [Hao Tiechuan: Central Government
Can Declare State of Emergency in Hong Kong], HOUSE NEWS (Jan. 9, 2014)
(copy on file with author).
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and love Hong Kong.”173 He also asserted that there were no ab-
solute rules for democratic development and that emulation of
democratic practices from overseas could result in social and eco-
nomic catastrophe.174 On June 10, 2014, the State Council Infor-
mation Office issued a White Paper on the Implementation of
“One Country, Two Systems” in Hong Kong (“the White Pa-
per”);175 it asserted that Beijing “directly exercises jurisdiction
over the HKSAR” and reiterated that “all those who adminis-
trate Hong Kong” were required to be “patriotic.”176
Despite these efforts, the pro-democracy camp remained unde-
terred. Between June 20 and June 29, Occupy Central held a
referendum with the assistance of the Hong Kong University
Public Opinion Program. Despite “one of the largest and most
sophisticated denial-of-service attacks in the Internet’s his-
tory,”177 nearly 800,000 voters participated.178 All three electoral
reform proposals on the ballot involved civil nomination of Chief
Executive candidates; collectively, the three proposals received
support from 91 percent of participating voters.179 In addition,
87.8 percent of participating voters agreed that Legco should
veto any proposal that was inconsistent with international
standards.180 Galvanized by the White Paper and the Occupy
Central referendum, 510,000 people participated in the annual
173. 「另搞一套 影響普選實現」張德江亮底線陳健民：難坐低談判 [“Doing
their own thing affects fulfilment of universal suffrage”: Zhang Dejiang Re-
veals Bottom Line; Chan Kin-man: Difficult to Negotiate], MINGPAO (H.K.),
Mar. 7, 2014.
174. Id.
175. OFFICE OF THECOMM’R OF THEMINISTRY OFFOREIGNAFFAIRS OFCHINA IN
H.K., The Practice of the “One Country, Two Systems” Policy in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (June 10, 2014),
http://www.fmcoprc.gov.hk/eng/xwdt/gsxw/t1164057.htm [hereinafter White
Paper].
176. Id. The implications of the White Paper for judicial independence are
outside the scope of this article.
177. Paul Mozur & Chester Yung,Hong Kong Democracy Poll Hit by Cyberat-
tack, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/hong-kong-de-
mocracy-poll-is-hit-by-cyberattack-1403258663.
178. Hong Kong Democracy “Referendum” Draws Nearly 800,000, BBCNEWS
(June 30, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-28076566.
179. Press Release, Occupy Central with Love and Peace, Nearly 800 Thou-
sand Hong Kong People Voted Against Non-Genuine Universal Suffrage (June
30, 2014), http://oclp.hk/index.php?route=occupy/eng_detail&eng_id=15.
180. Id.
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July 1 pro-democracy march;181 500 engaged in an overnight sit-
in in Central.182
Beijing’s supporters stepped up their opposition to democrats
over the summer of 2014. In June, the Hong Kong offices of the
“big four” accounting firms warned against Occupy Central in a
print advertisement.183 An anti-Occupy Central petition alleg-
edly gathered 1.4 million signatures, some of dubious origin or
procured under suspicious circumstances;184 C.Y. Leung even
signed the petition in his “personal capacity.”185 A subsequent
protest march on August 17 against Occupy Central was at-
tended by a large number of paid and bussed-in protesters, many
of whom were from Mainland China.186
The Hong Kong and Central Governments also played a role
in the city’s summer of discontent. On July 15, 2014, the Hong
Kong Government released its Consultation Report (the “2014
Consultation Report”) and submitted a report to Beijing on elec-
toral reform.187 The reference in the 2014 Consultation Report’s
reference to “mainstream opinion” backing political vetting of
181. See Keith Bradsher, Michael Forsythe & Chris Buckley, Huge Crowds
Turn Out for Pro-DemocracyMarch in Hong Kong, Defying Beijing, N.Y.TIMES,
July 1, 2014, http://nyti.ms/1rauNcy.
182. Alan Wong, Police Make More Arrests in Huge Hong Kong Protest,
SINOSPHERE (July 4, 2014, 6:47 AM), http://sinosphere.blogs.ny-
times.com/2014/07/04/police-make-more-arrests-in-huge-hong-kong-pro-
test/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
183. See, e.g., Enda Curran, Kathy Chu & James T. Areddy,Hong Kong Elec-
tion Ruling Stirs Fear Over City’s Status as Finance Hub, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1,
2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/beijing-decree-stirs-fear-over-hong-kong-
status-as-finance-hub-1409615560.
184. Learning From the Enemy, ECONOMIST, Aug. 23, 2014, http://www.econ-
omist.com/news/china/21613292-damaging-confrontation-looms-over-election-
2017-learning-enemy; 部分街站無核對 簽名者不知主題 [Some Street Stands
Fail to Verify Signatures; Signatories Unaware of Topic], MINGPAO (H.K.), July
20, 2014.
185. 梁振英:將簽名撐「反佔中」 [C.Y. Leung: Will Sign Petition Supporting
“Anti-Occupy”], MINGPAO (H.K.), July 27, 2014.
186. See Learning From the Enemy, supra note 184.
187. Press Release, H.K. Gov’t, Opening Remarks by CE at Press Conference
on Release of Constitutional Development Public Consultation Reports (July
15, 2014), http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201407/15/P201407150690.htm.
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candidates vindicated critics’ skepticism toward the consulta-
tion process.188 Although the 2014 Consultation Report left lim-
ited scope for compromise, 189 commentators nonetheless re-
mained optimistic.
All such hopes, however, were dashed with the 2014 Decision.
In its wake, Benny Tai declared, “[t]he road of dialogue has come
to the end.”190 In protest against the 2014 Decision, the Hong
Kong Federation of Students (HKFS), a group representing uni-
versity students, organized a weeklong class boycott starting on
September 22, 2014, which was joined by secondary school stu-
dents on September 26.191 On the night of September 26, protest-
ing students scaled a fence to enter the forecourt of Hong Kong
Government Headquarters, known as Civic Square. 192 Police
moved in with batons and pepper spray and took the protest-
ers—including HKFS leaders Alex Chow (周永康) and Lester
Shum (岑敖暉), as well as Joshua Wong (黃之鋒), leader of the
student protest group Scholarism—into custody.193 In the early
188. See Suzanne Pepper, Telling Beijing What Beijing Wants to Hear, CHINA
ELECTIONS & GOVERNANCE BLOGS (July 17, 2014, 4:55 AM), http://chinaelec-
tionsblog.net/hkfocus/?p=915 [Pepper, Telling Beijing]; No Panderers, Please:
This Issue’s Black and White, ECONOMIST, July 19, 2014, http://www.econo-
mist.com/news/leaders/21607855-time-britain-rediscover-its-moral-compass-
and-confront-china-over-hong-kong-no-panderers. The “mainstream opinion”
in question appears to have consisted in large part of pro forma submissions
sent as a result of mobilization by pro-Beijing parties. See建制表格式意見書製
造萬計民意 [Establishment Parties’ Pro-Forma Submissions Create Tens of
Thousands in Public Opinion], MINGPAO (H.K.), July 16, 2014.
189. See Pepper, Telling Beijing, supra note 188.
190. Political City: Denied Free Elections, Hong Kong’s Democrats Plan, Re-
luctantly, for Protest, ECONOMIST, Sept. 6, 2014, http://www.econo-
mist.com/news/china/21615636-denied-free-elections-hong-kongs-democrats-
plan-reluctantly-protest-political-city.
191. Timeline: Hong Kongers Call for Democracy and Universal Suffrage,
HUM. RTS. IN CHINA, http://www.hrichina.org/en/timeline-hong-kongers-call-
democracy-and-universal-suffrage (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
192. See Bei Hu, Hong Kong Police Arrest Six in Clash With Democracy Pro-
testers, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 27, 2014, available at http://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2014-09-27/hong-kong-police-arrest-six-in-clash-with-
democracy-protesters.
193. See Chris Buckley & Alan Wong, Pro-Democracy Students Are Arrested
in Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2014, http://www.ny-
times.com/2014/09/27/world/asia/hong-kong-democracy-leader-says-limits-
harm-rest-of-china.html; David Lague, James Pomfret, & Greg Torode, Special
Report: In “Umbrella Revolution,” China Confronts Limits of Its Power,
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hours of September 28, after police moved to surround protesters
gathered near Civic Square in support of the students, Benny
Tai declared that Occupy Central had begun—days earlier than
the movement’s originally scheduled date of October 1.194 Later
that day, the police deployed teargas against the assembled, un-
armed crowd. 195 The Umbrella Movement had begun in ear-
nest.196
3. Who Gets to Nominate?
As the debate over election of the Chief Executive in 2017 de-
veloped, controversy has centered on the nomination process, in-
cluding the composition of the Nominating Committee and the
criteria for nomination. Although there was some initial debate
over the process of appointment—in particular, whether Beijing
may veto a duly elected candidate—nomination remains the cen-
tral cause of disagreement.
Over the course of 2013, several nomination proposals
emerged, varying in levels of public participation. One of the ear-
liest and most conservative proposals came from Martin Lee
Chu-ming (李柱銘), a founding member of the Democratic Party.
Lee proposed that the current Election Committee be renamed
as the Nominating Committee, but that it be required to nomi-
nate five candidates. The latter requirement, Lee reasoned,
REUTERS, Oct. 1, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2014/10/01/us-hongkong-china-specialreport-idUSKCN0HQ4ZA20141001.
194. See Chris Buckley & Alan Wong, Pro-Democracy Group Shifts to Collab-
orate With Student Protesters in Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/28/world/asia/pro-democracy-protest-in-
hong-kong.html.
195. Press Release, H.K. Bar Ass’n, Statement of the Hong Kong Bar Associ-
ation on the Use of Force by the Hong Kong Police at Harcourt Road on 28
September 2014 (Sept. 29, 2014),
http://www.hkba.org/whatsnew/misc/20140929-Press_State-
ment_of_HKBA_29_September_2014.pdf.
196. On the genesis and chronology of the Umbrella Movement, see generally
Lauren Hilgers, Hong Kong’s Umbrella Revolution Isn’t Over Yet, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Feb. 18, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/22/magazine/hong-
kongs-umbrella-revolution-isnt-over-yet.html. A detailed exposition of the Um-
brella Movement and its aftermath is beyond the scope of this article.
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would secure the nomination of at least one pro-democracy poli-
tician.197 Lee’s proposal—which he had not discussed with the
Democratic Party—met with a “cool reception”; Lee retracted it
within two days.198
On May 8, 2013, the ATD set out what it described as “initial
views for consultation.” Among the initial views were the follow-
ing propositions:
(1) The electoral system must guarantee the right to
vote, the right to be elected and the right to nominate;
(2) There should be no “preliminary election,” “screen-
ing,” or conditions for candidacy that cannot be objec-
tively defined, such as “no confrontations with Beijing”;
(3) The Nominating Committee infringes free and fair
democratic principles. It should be formed by universal
suffrage and should ultimately be scrapped; and
(4) If a set proportion of Hong Kong voters nominates a
particular person by signatures, the nominated person
should become a candidate after the Nominating Com-
mittee verifies and endorses the public nomination.199
Two months later, on July 20, the ATD unveiled its three sub-
stantive proposals for 2017:
(1) Proposal One. The Nominating Committee would
resemble the current Election Committee in composi-
tion, albeit with the addition of directly elected District
Councilors. Any candidate would have to be nominated
by at least one tenth of the Committee’s members, or
by at least 2% of registered voters in geographical con-
stituency elections;
(2) Proposal Two. The Nominating Committee would
be directly elected by registered voters in geographical
constituencies, by proportional representation. Any
197. Suzanne Pepper, An Old Cat Singes His Whiskers, CHINA ELECTIONS &
GOVERNANCE BLOGS (May 2, 2013, 6:46 AM), http://chinaelec-
tionsblog.net/hkfocus/?p=574.
198. Id.
199. ALLIANCE FOR TRUE DEMOCRACY, 2017 Chief Executive Election—Initial
Views for Consultation, http://www.atd.hk/en/?page_id=105 (last visited Jan.
21, 2014).
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candidate would have to be nominated by at least one
tenth of the Committee’s members; and
(3) Proposal Three. The Nominating Committee
would be composed of all elected District Councilors,
and all elected Legislative Councilors. Any candidate
would have to be nominated by at least one tenth of the
Committee’s members, or by at least 2% of registered
voters in geographical constituency elections.200
Establishment figures responded with skepticism. Pro-Beijing
politician Tam Yiu-chung (譚耀宗) argued that the Nominating
Committee should be chosen from social sectors, along the lines
of the current Election Committee.201 Rao Geping (饒戈平), a sen-
ior BLC member, criticized the civil nomination process as hav-
ing no legal basis in the Basic Law.202
The failure of more moderate proposals to gain momentum left
an opening for more bolder suggestions. On July 29, 2013, the
secondary school student activist group, Scholarism (學民思潮),
announced that it would devote its energies to canvassing for
political reform.203 Two days later, it declared that it would de-
mand civil nomination of candidates for Chief Executive.204 How
could there be a more “broadly representative” Nominating
Committee, Scholarism asked, than a body composed of the en-
tire Hong Kong electorate?205
200. ALLIANCE FOR TRUE DEMOCRACY, Proposals for the 2017 CE Election
Package, http://www.atd.hk/en/?page_id=109 (last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
201. Kelly Ip, Bid to Widen Role of Voters, STANDARD (H.K.), Jul. 11. 2013,
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_de-
tail.asp?pp_cat=30&art_id=135417&sid=39938189&con_type=1. For an expla-
nation of the current composition of the Election Committee, see infra Part
II.D.
202. Ip, supra note 201.
203. Press Release, Scholarism, 729政改晚會聲明 [Declaration on the Politi-
cal Reform Gathering on the Evening of July 29] (Jul. 29, 2013), http://schol-
arism.com/2013/07/31/729%e6%94%bf%e6%94%b9%e6%99%9a%e6%9c%83%
e8%81%b2%e6%98%8e/.
204. Press Release, Scholarism, 聲明：政改底線 寸步不讓 [Declaration: We
Will Not Yield an Inch on the Bottom Line for Political Reform] (Jul. 31, 2013),
http://schol-
arism.com/2013/07/31/%e8%81%b2%e6%98%8e%ef%bc%9a%e6%94%bf%e6%
94%b9%e5%ba%95%e7%b7%9a-
%e5%af%b8%e6%ad%a5%e4%b8%8d%e8%ae%93/.
205. Id.
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The Beijing and Hong Kong Governments fulminated against
any suggestion that the public should be allowed to nominate
candidates. Zhang Xiaoming refused to attend a forum orga-
nized by the Civic Party, curtly stating that Article 45 of the
Basic Law only permitted nominations to be made by a Nomi-
nating Committee.206 C.Y. Leung spoke out against civil nomi-
nation, alleging that the Basic Law does not permit it. 207 Profes-
sor Albert Chen has suggested that “nominations” by the public
be treated as purely advisory.208 The Hong Kong electorate, it
seemed, was free to suggest a name—but the Nominating Com-
mittee was equally free to ignore it.209 Rao Geping went further,
asserting that even “civil recommendation” was impermissi-
ble.210
The debate regarding nomination suggests that the official po-
sition from both Hong Kong and Beijing is that the Basic Law
means, “[W]hatever Beijing officials say it means, whenever
they choose to say it.” 211 As a result, subsequent proposals for
reform were clouded by defeatism. On January 8, 2014, the ATD
proposed a “three-track” plan involving civil nomination, politi-
206. Tanna Chong, Civil Nomination Proposal Violates Basic Law, Says
Zhang Xiaoming, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), Sept. 13, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1308950/civil-nomination-pro-
posal-violates-basic-law-says-zhang-xiaoming.
207. See, e.g.,梁振英：政改要跟《基本法》 學者：針對公民提名 [C.Y. Leung:
Political Reform Must Comply with Basic Law; Scholars: Remarks Targeted at
Civil Nomination], MINGPAO (H.K.), Sept. 28, 2013.
208. See Stuart Lau, Central Government Adviser on Hong Kong Rejects Civil
Nomination for 2017, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), Sept. 23, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1315514/central-government-
adviser-hong-kong-rejects-civil-nomination-2017.
209. Suzanne Pepper, Exploring the Options: Civil Nomination, CHINA
ELECTIONS & GOVERNANCE BLOGS (Sept. 23, 2013, 7:32 AM), http://chinaelec-
tionsblog.net/hkfocus/?p=644 [hereinafter Pepper, Exploring the Options].
210. Kahon Chan, Civil Nomination Breaches Basic Law: Expert, CHINA
DAILY (Mar. 24, 2014, 8:33 AM), http://www.chinadailyasia.com/hknews/2014-
03/24/content_15126545.html. Chief Secretary Carrie Lam described Rao’s
comments as representing the “final word” on nomination. Kelly Ip, Lam
Hedges Over Her “Final Word” Meaning, STANDARD (H.K.), Mar. 24, 2014,
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?art_id=143753&con_type=1.
211. Suzanne Pepper, New Year’s Day, 2014: A Wake-Up Call?, CHINA
ELECTIONS & GOVERNANCE BLOGS (Jan. 6, 2014, 8:08 AM), http://chinaelec-
tionsblog.net/hkfocus/?p=713.
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cal party nomination, and Nominating Committee nomina-
tion. 212 However, the “three-track” plan would involve no
changes to the composition of the Nominating Committee com-
pared to the composition of the current Election Committee.213
On March 20, 2014, think-tank Hong Kong 2020, headed by for-
mer Chief Secretary Anson Chan (陳方安生), issued a proposal
that made no provision for nomination by the public or by polit-
ical parties.214 The Hong Kong 2020 proposal altered the compo-
sition of the Nominating Committee, but provided that the sup-
port of 10 percent of nominators should be sufficient for candi-
dacy.215 On April 2, eighteen academics proposed a “civil recom-
mendation” system under which any person could become a can-
didate for Chief Executive if they received the recommendation
of 2–3 percent of the electorate, in addition to the support of one
eighth of the Nominating Committee.216 Ultimately, the “three-
track” plan became one of three proposals listed on the Occupy
Central referendum ballot in June 2014; despite—or perhaps be-
cause of—its relative lack of ambition, it was ultimately en-
dorsed by a majority of voters participating in the referendum.217
Despite these apparent concessions from the democratic camp,
the 2014 Decision showed no signs of reciprocation. The 2014
Decision emphasized the Chief Executive’s responsibilities both
to the HKSAR and to the Central Government and declared that
the requirement of “loving the country and loving Hong Kong”
was a corollary of that dual mandate.218 It therefore declared
212. ALLIANCE FOR TRUE DEMOCRACY, Chief Executive Election Plan,
http://www.atd.hk/en/?p=174 (last visited Jan. 20, 2014).
213. Suzanne Pepper, Pan-Democrats Answer Back, CHINA ELECTIONS &
GOVERNANCE BLOGS (Jan. 13, 2014, 6:59 AM), http://chinaelec-
tionsblog.net/hkfocus/?p=720. For an explanation of the current composition of
the Election Committee, see infra Part II.D.
214. See Press Release, Hong Kong 2020, Hong Kong 2020 Preliminary Pro-
posals on ‘Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive in 2017 and for Forming
the Legislative Council in 2016’ (Mar. 20, 2014),
http://hongkong2020.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/hong-kong-2020-initial-re-
sponse-with-annex.pdf;陳太普選方案無公民提名 [Anson Chan’s Universal Suf-
frage Proposal Omits Civil Nomination], MINGPAO (H.K.), Mar. 21, 2014.
215. Id.
216. 18學者不違憲方案設公民推薦 [18 Scholars’ Constitutional Proposal Pro-
vides for Civil Recommendation], MINGPAO (H.K.), Apr. 3, 2014.
217. See Press Release, Occupy Central with Love and Peace, supra note 179.
218. See 2014 Decision, supra note 2.
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that candidates (of which there would be between two and three)
had to be selected by a Nominating Committee with the same
composition as the existing Election Committee.219 Each candi-
date would have to receive the support of at least half of the
members of the Nominating Committee.220 The practical effect
of these requirements, taken in conjunction, would be to make it
“effectively impossible” for any pro-democracy politician to stand
for election. 221 The 2014 Decision came with an embedded
threat: if electoral reforms could not be approved, the 2017 elec-
tion would continue to use the same arrangements as the much-
maligned 2012 election.222 The tough line from Beijing reflected
in the 2014 Decision not only frustrated Hong Kongers’ demo-
cratic aspirations; it also made the explosion of public discontent
in the Umbrella Movement inevitable.223
The Hong Kong Government has conducted a second round of
public consultations on electoral reform. However, it proceeded
on the basis of the much-maligned 2014 Decision.224 Despite ef-
forts to salvage the 2014 Decision225–most notably by Albert
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., Shannon Tiezzi, China Drafts Rules for Hong Kong Elections,
DIPLOMAT, Aug, 29, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/china-drafts-rules-
for-hong-kong-elections/. This seems to have been the intended effect. See
James Pomfret, China Asserts Paternal Rights Over Hong Kong in Democracy
Clash, REUTERS, Sept. 11, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2014/09/11/us-china-hongkong-insight-idUSKBN0H600120140911 (citing
anonymous sources stating that Zhang Xiaoming told Hong Kong democrats
that the fact that they were allowed to stay alive was abundant reflection of
Chinese inclusiveness).
222. See 2014 Decision, supra note 2.
223. See Charles Mok, This Clash With Beijing’s Outmoded Thinking Was
Inevitable, N.Y. TIMES ROOM FOR DEBATE (Sept. 29, 2014, 12:57 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/09/29/is-autonomy-possible-for-
hong-kong/this-clash-with-beijings-outmoded-thinking-was-inevitable (com-
ments by a pan-democratic legislator).
224. H.K. GOV’T, 2017 SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY: METHOD FOR SELECTING THE
CHIEF EXECUTIVE BY UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, fore-
word, ¶ 4, at v (2015). The paragraph gives an indication of the extent of gov-
ernmental indifference to demands for democracy (“Regardless of which view
you hold”); see also H.K. GOV’T, 2017 MAKE ITHAPPEN: METHOD FOR SELECTING
THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE BY UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE CONSULTATION REPORT AND
PROPOSALS (2015).
225. See, e.g., Press Release, Hong Kong 2020, Hong Kong 2020 Proposal
(Mar. 4, 2015), http://hongkong2020.com/2015/03/04/press-release-04032015-
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Chen226–pan-democrats have vowed to veto any proposal based
on the framework it prescribes. 227 Beijing’s response was to
make the pan-democrats an offer they could not refuse: if the
reform was vetoed, Rao Geping declared, all future reforms
would proceed on the basis of the 2014 Decision.228
II. APPLICABLE LAW
This Part shall discuss the legal underpinnings of the post-
1997 Hong Kong legal order, before turning to the PRC’s attitude
toward treaties and the relevant provisions of the Joint Declara-
tion, the Basic Law, and the ICCPR. It will then consider the
potential applicability of customary international law, insofar as
it is reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“UDHR”) and other indicia of customary international law.
A. The Contested Basis of Hong Kong’s New Legal Order
Mainland Chinese commentators have emphasized that post-
1997 Hong Kong is a creature of the PRC Constitution. Peking
University’s Qiang Shigong (強世功) has asserted that the Basic
Law derives its normative nature from the PRC Constitution,
hongkong2020-proposal/ (expressing dismay at the 2014 Decision but stating
a desire to continue participating in the consultation process).
226. See, e.g., Stuart Lau, Basic Law Expert Albert Chen Tries to Steer Middle
Road on Reform for Hong Kong Chief Executive Election, S. CHINA MORNING
POST (H.K.), Jan. 26, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/arti-
cle/1691393/basic-law-expert-albert-chen-tries-steer-middle-road-reform-
hong-kong; Albert Chen, “Pocket the Proposal First?” Folk Wisdom and the
Mentality of Hong Kong’s Pan-Democrats, HKU LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP BLOG
(Mar. 3, 2015, 10:47 PM), http://researchblog.law.hku.hk/2015/03/albert-chen-
pocket-proposal-first-folk.html.
227. Jeffie Lam, Stuart Lau & Joyce Ng, Prospects for Political Reform in
Hong Kong Fade as Pan-Democrats Vow to Block Plan, S. CHINAMORNINGPOST
(H.K.), Jan. 8, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/arti-
cle/1676748/government-wants-political-reform-vetoed.
228. 饒戈平﹕倘拉倒 日後仍循8‧31 [Rao Geping: If Vetoed, Future Proposals
Will Follow August 31 Decision], MINGPAO (H.K.), Mar. 3, 2015,
http://news.mingpao.com/pns/%E9%A5%92%E6%88%88%E5%B9%B3%EF%
B9%95%E5%80%98%E6%8B%89%E5%80%92%20%E6%97%A5%E5%BE%8
C%E4%BB%8D%E5%BE%AA8%E2%80%A731-
%E3%80%8C%E4%BA%BA%E5%A4%A7%E6%A1%86%E6%9E%B6%E7%84
%A1%E4%BF%AE%E6%94%B9%E5%8F%AF%E8%83%BD%E3%80%8D/we
b_tc/article/20150304/s00001/1425405749443.
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not the Joint Declaration.229 Similarly, the White Paper devotes
only one paragraph to the Joint Declaration,230 referring to it
merely as “confirmation” of China’s resumption of sover-
eignty.231
Such accounts of Hong Kong’s legal order, framed purely in
terms of Chinese domestic law, are misleading. The Preamble to
the Basic Law expressly states that it has been enacted “to en-
sure the implementation of the basic policies of the [PRC] re-
garding Hong Kong.” 232 The “basic policies” referred to in the
Preamble could only be those referred to in the Joint Declara-
tion; indeed, Article 3(12) of the Joint Declaration declares that
the basic policies would be “stipulated” in the Basic Law.233 Xiao
Weiyun (蕭蔚雲), a member of the Drafting Committee hailed as
one of the “guardians” of the Basic Law,234 acknowledged that
the Joint Declaration “has its legal status and effect” and that it
“affirms the task to enshrine in law the principle of ‘one country,
two systems.’”235
Nonetheless, even if one accepts that China intended to imple-
ment the Joint Declaration through the Basic Law, it does not
follow that the Basic Law achieves that objective. This article
proceeds on the basis that the provisions of the Basic Law admit
of an interpretation consistent with the Joint Declaration. How-
ever, the compatibility of the Basic Law with the Joint Declara-
tion—in particular, whether its provisions on “elections” are con-
sistent with the Joint Declaration—remains an open question.236
229. Shigong Qiang, 國際人權公約在香港：被誤讀的國際條約 [The ICCPR in
Hong Kong: The Misinterpreted International Treaty], MINGPAO (H.K.), Aug.
25, 2014.
230. See White Paper, supra note 175.
231. Hong Kong pro-democracy tabloid Apple Daily alleged that Qiang was
one of the co-authors of the White Paper. 撰文撐中央干預港事務 強世功幕後黑
手 [Qiang Shigong Mastermind of Articles Advocating Central Intervention in
Hong Kong Affairs], APPLEDAILY (H.K.), June 12, 2014.
232. Basic Law, supra note 62, at Preamble.
233. Joint Declaration, supra note 61, art. 3(12).
234. See Jimmy Cheung, Basic Law ‘Guardian’ Dies at 78, S. CHINAMORNING
POST (H.K.), Jul. 16, 2004, http://www.scmp.com/article/463304/basic-law-
guardian-dies-78.
235. See XIAO WEIYUN, ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE
DRAFTING OF THEHONGKONG BASIC LAW 13 (2001).
236. Id. at 67–69; Boasberg, supra note 28.
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B. The PRC’s Attitude Toward Treaties
1. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”)
The PRC acceded to the VCLT on September 3, 1997.237 Xue
Hanqin (薛捍勤), writing in a personal capacity prior to her ap-
pointment to the ICJ, suggested that, as a party to the VCLT,
“China should comply with its treaty obligations in good faith
and should not use its internal law as a justification for evading
its international obligations, as provided in Article 27 of the Con-
vention.”238 Even prior to the PRC’s accession to the VCLT, it
considered many of the VCLT’s provisions to reflect existing
principles of customary international law.239
The VCLT, and the rules of customary international law it re-
flects, are relevant to the observance and interpretation of trea-
ties, including the Joint Declaration and the ICCPR. They are
also relevant to the validity of reservations to the ICCPR.
The rules governing the observance of treaties are uncontro-
versial. The Article 26 rule of pacta sunt servanda (“agreements
must be kept”) was well established by Ulpian’s time;240 its va-
lidity has never been questioned by any international tribu-
nal.241 Similarly, the rule in Article 27 that a party’s domestic
law does not excuse its non-performance of a treaty reflects cus-
tomary international law.242
The VCLT’s provisions regarding treaty interpretation and
reservation are more problematic. Under Article 31(1), “[a]
237. Status of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. TREATY
COLLECTION, https://trea-
ties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&c
hapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (last visited Dec. 30, 2013).
238. Hanqin Xue & Qian Jin, International Treaties in the Chinese Domestic
Legal System, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 299, 305 (2009).
239. Jay R. Goldstein, Chinese and Western Treaty Practice: An Application
to the Joint Declaration Between the People’s Republic of China and Great Brit-
ain Concerning the Question of Hong Kong, 1 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 167, 177–78
(1986). See also Panos Merkouris, Introduction: Interpretation Is a Science, Is
an Art, Is a Science, in TREATY INTERPRETATION AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 30 YEARSON 1, at 9 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds.,
2010).
240. MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF TREATIES 363 (2009).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 370.
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treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in light of its object and purpose.”243 Article 31(2)
defines what the “context” of the treaty is for the purposes of
interpretation. Article 31(3) provides that, in addition to the con-
text, the following factors should be taken into account:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties re-
garding the interpretation of the treaty or the applica-
tion of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in
the relations between the parties.244
Article 31(3)(c) does not specify whether the “relevant rules”
are the rules applicable at the time the treaty was entered into
or the rules applicable at the time of interpretation.245 Scholarly
opinion differs as to the question of intertemporality. Judge
Mark Villiger, writing extrajudicially, suggests that the applica-
ble rules are those in force at the time of interpretation.246 Such
an interpretation creates the possibility that customary rules
may substantially modify treaty provisions over time.247 Profes-
sors Ulf Linderfalk and Campbell McLachlan, however, suggest
that it is only appropriate to consider the rules in force at the
time of interpretation if the parties had so intended.248 Professor
McLachlan identifies three indicia of intent to adopt a term or
concept with an ambulatory meaning:
243. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
244. Id. art. 31(2), (3).
245. Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article
31(3)(C) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L&COMP. L.Q. 279, 290–91 (2008).
246. VILLIGER, supra note 240, at 433.
247. Id.
248. McLachlan, supra note 245, at 316–18; ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE
INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES: THEMODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW AS EXPRESSED
IN THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 182 (2007).
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(1) Use of a term which carries an evolving meaning as
amatter of general international law, without adopting
a specific definition;
(2) Entry into a treaty which commits the parties to a
program of progressive development; and
(3) Description of obligations in general terms, which
must be read in light of changing circumstances.249
Article 32 permits the use of supplementary means of inter-
pretation, including the travaux préparatoires (preparatory
works) and the circumstances of its conclusion, to confirm an in-
terpretation made under Article 31 or to determine the meaning
when an interpretation under Article 31 is ambiguous, obscure,
or leads to a “manifestly absurd or unreasonable” result.250
Article 19 permits reservations to treaties unless the reserva-
tion is prohibited by the treaty, the reservation falls outside a
closed list of reservations enumerated in the treaty, or the res-
ervation is otherwise incompatible with the object and purpose
of the treaty.251 However, Article 19 does not state the legal con-
sequences of a legally impermissible reservation. The Interna-
tional Law Commission suggests that such a reservation may be
severable if the reserving State intended to be bound by the
treaty without the benefit of the reservation.252
2. Customary International Law
Even prior to the PRC’s accession to the VCLT, it considered
the VCLT’s provisions—in particular, the provisions governing
treaty interpretation and termination—to be binding, insofar as
they reflect customary international law.253
249. McLachlan, supra note 245, at 317–18.
250. VCLT, supra note 243, art. 32.
251. Id. art. 19.
252. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 63rd Sess., Apr. 26–June 3, July 4–Aug.
12, 2011, ¶ 4.5.3, U.N. Doc. A/66/10/Add.1; GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp. No. 10
(2011) [hereinafter ILC Guide to Practice]. See also Edward T. Swaine, Treaty
Reservations, in THEOXFORDGUIDE TOTREATIES 293–98 (Duncan B. Hollis ed.,
2012).
253. Goldstein, supra note 239, at 177–78.
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Articles 26 and 27 of the VCLT codify pre-existing rules of cus-
tomary law on the duty to observe treaties.254 The position re-
garding Articles 31 and 32 is less certain. The existence of any
customary rules regarding treaty interpretation prior to the
VCLT is questionable.255 However, it is at least arguable that
Articles 31 and 32 now reflect emerging customary law.256 Simi-
larly, it appears that the VCLT’s provisions on reservations (in-
cluding Article 19) may not have reflected pre-existing custom-
ary law, but have given rise to a new customary norm.257
C. The Joint Declaration
The PRC’s “basic policies” toward Hong Kong are set out in
Article 3 of the Joint Declaration, with further elaboration in
Annex I.258 These basic policies include the following:
(1) Hong Kong would enjoy “a high degree of autonomy,
except in foreign and [defense] affairs”;
(2) The Central Government would appoint the Chief
Executive based on the results of elections or consulta-
tions;
(3) “Rights and freedoms, including those of the person,
of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of
travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of
choice of occupation, of academic research and of reli-
gious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region;” and
(4) The basic policies would be set out in the Basic Law
and would remain unchanged for 50 years after the cre-
ation of the Hong Kong SAR.
Section I of Annex I explained the means by which the Chief
Executive and legislature would be chosen:
The government and legislature of the Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region shall be composed of local inhabitants. The
254. VILLIGER, supra note 240, at 363, 370.
255. Id. at 439–40, 448.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 324–25. See also Thomas Giegerich, Treaties, Multilateral, Reser-
vations to, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L LAW, http://opil.ou-
plaw.com/home/EPIL (enter title as search term) (last visited Jan. 6, 2014), ¶
7.
258. Joint Declaration, supra note 61, art. 3 & Annex I.
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chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion shall be selected by election or through consultations held
locally and be appointed by the Central People’s Government.
Principal officials (equivalent to Secretaries) shall be nomi-
nated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region and appointed by the Central People’s Govern-
ment. The legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region shall be constituted by elections. The executive author-
ities shall abide by the law and shall be accountable to the leg-
islature.259
Article 8 of the Joint Declaration provided that the provisions
of the Joint Declaration and of its annexes “shall be equally bind-
ing.”260
On its face, the Joint Declaration merely requires selection of
the Chief Executive by one of two means: election or consulta-
tion. It imposes no specific requirements regarding the election
or consultation process.261 However, in promulgating the Basic
Law, Beijing has elected to select the Chief Executive using an
“election” process—albeit (from the perspective of advocates of
democratization) a fundamentally flawed one.
D. The Basic Law
The Basic Law is not a treaty. However, it is partly a creature
of the Joint Declaration.262 The drafting process was fraught
with tensions between liberal and conservative Drafting Com-
mittee members;263 after 1989, Beijing threw its weight behind
the conservative faction. The structure of Legco from 1997 to
2007 reflected the extent of the conservative victory. During that
period, half of its members were selected through functional con-
stituencies,264 cementing the influence of business and profes-
sional interests.265 During the same 10-year period, the number
259. Id. Annex I, ch. I.
260. Id. art. 8. See also XIAO, supra note 235, at 13.
261. See, e.g., C.Y. Leung,Hong Kong Must Seize the First Chance to Elect Its
Own Leaders, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 8, 2014,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/22864004-34ee-11e4-aa47-00144feabdc0.html.
262. See XIAO, supra note 235, at 13.
263. See supra Part I.C.
264. Boasberg, supra note 28, at 331–32; GHAI, supra note 31, at 259–60.
265. Boasberg, supra note 28, at 332; GHAI, supra note 31, at 260–61.
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of directly elected members increased from twenty to thirty over
the course of three electoral terms.266
Nonetheless, Article 68(2) of the Basic Law declared:
The method for forming the Legislative Council shall be speci-
fied in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Spe-
cial Administrative Region and in accordance with the princi-
ple of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the
election of all the members of the Legislative Council by uni-
versal suffrage.267
Annex II to the Basic Law provides that amendments to the
composition of Legco can only be made after 2007. Provided
“there is a need” for such amendment:
[S]uch amendments must be made with the endorsement of a
two-thirds majority of all the members of the Council and the
consent of the Chief Executive, and they shall be reported to
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for
the record.268 (Emphasis added)
The selection of the Chief Executive was a similar combination
of the reactionary with the aspirational. To select the first Chief
Executive, the NPC would appoint a Preparatory Committee,
which would in turn appoint a Selection Committee, which
would in turn recommend a candidate.269 Subsequent Chief Ex-
ecutives would be chosen by an 800-member Election Committee
from a list of candidates, each nominated by at least one hundred
electors.270 The Central Government would appoint members of
the Election Committee from four interest groups (selecting 200
members from each group):
(1) The industrial, commercial and financial sectors;
(2) The professions;
266. Basic Law, supra note 62, Annex II; Decision of the National People’s
Congress on the Method for the Formation of the First Government and the
First Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 4, 1990),
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_ind.nsf/curalleng-
doc/8E4706E4D2D578D7482575EE000E4FB6?OpenDocument (China).
267. Basic Law, supra note 62, art. 68(2).
268. Id. Annex II.
269. Boasberg, supra note 28, at 334–35; GHAI, supra note 31, at 258.
270. GHAI, supra note 31, at 258–59.
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(3) Labour, social services, religious and other sectors;
and
(4) Members of the Legislative Council, representatives
of district-based organizations, Hong Kong deputies to
the National People’s Congress, and representatives of
Hong Kong members of the National Committee of the
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.271
Article 45(2) of the Basic Law provides that the “ultimate aim”
is for the Chief Executive to be selected “by universal suffrage
upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating com-
mittee in accordance with democratic procedures.”272
Annex I to the Basic Law governs amendments to the selection
method of the Chief Executive after 2007. If “there is a need” for
amendment:
[S]uch amendments must be made with the endorsement of a
two-thirds majority of all the members of the Legislative Coun-
cil and the consent of the Chief Executive, and they shall be
reported to the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress for approval. 273 (Emphasis added)
Neither Article 45 nor Article 68 set a deadline for democrati-
zation. The only apparent stipulation is that no changes may
take place before 2007.274
Despite its promises of universal suffrage for the Chief Execu-
tive and Legco elections, the Basic Law provides a multitude of
methods for Beijing to block democratization in Hong Kong.
Legco electoral methods must comply with “the actual situation”
in Hong Kong and “the principle of gradual and orderly pro-
gress.”275 Yet the Basic Law offers no guidance on who deter-
mines the “actual situation” in Hong Kong or what criteria are
relevant to that determination. Similarly, the Basic Law does
not define what “broadly representative”means in the context of
nominations of candidates for Chief Executive. Nor does it state
who determines whether there is a “need” for amendment. Per-
haps most damningly, the Basic Law does not prescribe any
271. Basic Law, supra note 62, Annex I.
272. Id. art. 45(2).
273. Id. Annex I.
274. Id. Annexes I and II.
275. Id. art. 68(2). The language of “gradual and orderly progress” also ap-
pears in art. 45(2), governing Chief Executive electoral reform.
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timeline for democratization—except that no changes may take
place before 2007.276 The power to determine the “actual situa-
tion” in Hong Kong or the “need” to amend the electoral process
would amount to a power of veto over democratic development.
A particularly obstructive NPCSC might determine that the “ac-
tual situation” in Hong Kong demanded political stagnation un-
til 2047, when the PRC’s basic policies toward Hong Kong expire.
Alternatively, the NPCSC could dictate terms of reform incon-
sistent with internationally accepted conceptions of democracy.
The NPCSC could interpret “broadly representative” to permit
exclusion of discrete minorities from the Nominating Commit-
tee. The reference to “democratic procedures” suggests a partic-
ularly thin conception of democracy in the nominating process,
without regard to substantive rights associated with democracy.
E. The ICCPR
The last paragraph of Chapter XIII of Annex I in the Joint Dec-
laration and Article 39 of the Basic Law both provide that the
provisions of the ICCPR, “as applied to Hong Kong,” will remain
in force after 1997.277 These provisions include Article 40, which
imposes the obligation to submit reports to the Human Rights
Committee.278
When the United Kingdom ratified the ICCPR in 1976, it en-
tered (inter alia) the following reservation in respect of Hong
Kong:
The Government of the United Kingdom reserve the right not
to apply sub-paragraph (b) of article 25 in so far as it may re-
quire the establishment of an elected Executive or Legislative
Council in Hong Kong.279
Article 25(b) of the ICCPR provides that every citizen shall
have the right “[t]o vote and to be elected at genuine periodic
276. Id. Annexes I and II.
277. Joint Declaration, supra note 61, Annex I, ch. XIII; Basic Law, supra
note 62, art. 39.
278. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 40, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
279. Status of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N.
TREATY COLLECTION, http://trea-
ties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en%23EndDec#EndDec (last visited Dec. 30, 2013).
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elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage . . . guar-
anteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.”280 Such
a right shall not be subject to distinctions of, inter alia, political
opinion, nor shall it be subject to unreasonable restrictions.281
1. Interpreting the ICCPR
Scholars have debated whether normal rules of treaty inter-
pretation apply to the interpretation of the ICCPR. Dr. Başak
Çali has argued that the interpretation of human rights treaties
involves a specialized application of the VCLT, rather than a dis-
tinct set of interpretive principles.282 In Dr. Çali’s account, the
starting point in interpreting human rights treaties is the prin-
ciple of effectiveness.283 As a corollary of the good faith require-
ment of Article 31 of the VCLT, the proper interpretation of hu-
man rights treaty provisions is an interpretation that makes
their provisions “effective, real, and practical.”284 The effective-
ness principle has two aspects. First, provisions should be inter-
preted in a manner that confers effective, rather than formal,
rights.285 Second, interpreters should adopt a teleological ap-
proach and ask what circumstances allow other concerns to
trump human rights treaty provisions.286 As a result of the effec-
tiveness principle, interpreters have favored dynamic interpre-
tation over original intent in interpreting human rights instru-
ments.287
A further corollary of Article 31 of the VCLT in the human
rights treaty context is the principle of coherence. Interpreters
of human rights treaties typically interpret treaties in light of
general international law and other treaties and instruments.288
280. ICCPR, supra note 278, art. 25(b).
281. Id. art. 2 & art. 25(b).
282. Başak Çali, Specialized Rules of Treaty Interpretation: Human Rights,
in THEOXFORDGUIDE TO TREATIES 525, 533–37 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012).
283. Id. at 538.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 539.
286. Id.
287. See Id. at 547.
288. Id. at 541–42.
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Other rules of international law may be excluded, deemed to dis-
place human rights treaty interpretation, or accommodated in
the interpretation of human rights treaties.289
Reservations to human rights treaties raise further questions.
In General Comment 24, the Human Rights Committee consid-
ered that, in general, incompatible reservations may be severed
from the ICCPR.290 However, General Comment 24 drew strong
criticism from, inter alia, the United Kingdom.291 The Interna-
tional Law Commission has rejected the idea that a special re-
gime applies to reservations to human rights treaties;292 in its
Guide to Practice, it espouses a more generalized approach to
severability, under which severability depends on whether the
reserving State intended to be bound without the benefit of the
reservation.293
2. Status of the Reservation to Article 25(b)
When the United Kingdom ratified the ICCPR on behalf of
Hong Kong in 1976, it entered a reservation in respect of Article
25(b), insofar as Article 25(b) required the establishment of an
elected Executive or Legco in Hong Kong. Opponents of democ-
ratization have cited the reservation as evidence that Article
25(b) does not apply to Hong Kong at all. In its submissions to
the Human Rights Committee, the SAR Government—and,
prior to 1997, the U.K. Government—maintained that the reser-
vation continues to apply.294 BLC members Maria Tam and Rao
289. Id. at 541–45.
290. Human Rights Comm., Gen. Comment No. 24: Issues Relating to Reser-
vations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional
Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Cove-
nant, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 4, 1994). See also Swaine,
supra note 252, at 295–96; Çali, supra note 282, at 533–37; and JOSEPH &
CASTAN, supra note 23, at 886–87.
291. Çali, supra note 282, at 536. See also JOSEPH& CASTAN, supra note 23,
at 886.
292. Swaine, supra note 252, at 298.
293. ILC Guide to Practice, supra note 252, ¶ 4.5.3; see also Swaine, supra
note 252, at 296–98.
294. U.K. GOV’T, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND IN RESPECT OF HONG KONG UNDER THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ¶ 35 (1996) [herein-
after 1996 SUPPLEMENTARY SUBMISSIONS]; H.K. GOV’T, REPORT OF THE HONG
KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN
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Geping have argued that Article 25(b) does not apply to Hong
Kong,295 as has Qiang Shigong.296
The Human Rights Committee, however, contends that the
reservation no longer applies. In considering the existence of
functional constituency seats in Legco, the Committee concluded
that, once an elected legislature was established, its election
must conform to the requirements of Article 25(b):
The Committee is aware of the reservation made by the United
Kingdom that article 25 does not require establishment of an
elected Executive or Legislative Council. It however takes the
view that once an elected Legislative Council is established, its
election must conform to article 25 of the Covenant. The Com-
mittee considers that the electoral system in Hong Kong does
not meet the requirements of article 25, as well as articles 2, 3
and 26 of the Covenant.297
Successive Hong Kong Governments, both before and after
1997, have given four responses to the Human Rights Commit-
THE LIGHT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ¶
461 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 SUBMISSIONS]; H.K. GOV’T, FIRST REPORT OF THE
HKSAROF THEPRC IN THELIGHT OF THE ICCPR: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
¶ 169 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 SUPPLEMENTARY SUBMISSIONS],; H.K. GOV’T,
SECOND PERIODIC REPORT OF THEHONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE LIGHT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION’S RESPONSE TO THE LIST OF ISSUES PRESENTED
BY THEHUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE ON 7 NOVEMBER 2005 (CCPR/C/HKG/Q/2) ¶
1.11 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 SUBMISSIONS]; H.K. Gov’t, THIRD PERIODIC
REPORT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OFCHINA IN THELIGHT OF THE INTERNATIONALCOVENANTONCIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS ¶¶ 315–23 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 SUBMISSIONS].
295. Tony Cheung & Emily Tsang, Query on Need to Meet World Standards,
S. CHINAMORNING POST (H.K.), Jul. 11, 2013; Stuart Lau & Colleen Lee, Basic
Law Expert Accused of Twisting Facts on Voting Rights, S. CHINA MORNING
POST (H.K.), Apr. 1, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/arti-
cle/1204187/basic-law-expert-accused-twisting-facts-voting-rights. But see
Geping Rao, The Application of the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights to Hong Kong, 2 PAC. RIM. L. &POL’Y J. 9, 13 (1993) (stating without
explanation that developments in Hong Kong put the continued necessity of
the reservation in question).
296. Shigong Qiang, The ICCPR in Hong Kong: The Misinterpreted Interna-
tional Treaty, supra note 229.
297. 1995 CONCLUDINGOBSERVATIONS, supra note 23, ¶ 19.
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tee. First, the Human Rights Committee overlooked the reserva-
tion to Article 25(b).298 Second, the system of functional constit-
uencies did not give rise to any incompatibility with any of the
provisions of the ICCPR as applied to Hong Kong.299 Third, func-
tional constituencies served a historical function in providing
representation to Hong Kong’s economic and professional sectors
to reflect their importance in the community.300 Fourth, func-
tional constituencies are a transitional measure in the pursuit
of the ultimate aim of universal suffrage.301
However, none of these arguments withstands scrutiny. The
first and second arguments amount to the assertion that Article
25(b) never applied to Hong Kong. Such an assertion begs the
question of the continued relevance of the reservation to Article
25(b).302 The third and fourth arguments presuppose that Article
25(b) applies to Hong Kong, but that there is no breach of the
obligations contained therein.303 The 1995 iteration of the Hu-
man Rights Committee rejected that premise. It found that func-
tional constituencies gave “undue weight to the views of the
business community” and therefore, contravened the equal suf-
frage requirement of Article 25.304
It is not entirely clear how the Human Rights Committee
reached its conclusion that, once a legislature is constituted by
elections, its election must comply with the requirements of Ar-
ticle 25(b).305 Nonetheless, the Human Rights Committee’s con-
clusion may be supported by interpreting the ICCPR in light of
customary international law, under Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT.
Article 40 of the ICCPR imposes a reporting obligation, under
which state parties must regularly submit reports on, inter alia,
298. 1999 SUBMISSIONS, supra note 294, ¶ 461; Seren S.T. Tang, Status of the
Reservation to the Right to Vote in Hong Kong 5 (H.K. Univ. Ctr. Comp. &
Pub. L., Occasional Paper No. 17, 2008).
299. Id.
300. 1996 SUPPLEMENTARY SUBMISSIONS, supra note 294, ¶ 34; 1999
SUBMISSIONS, supra note 294, ¶ 461(b); Tang, supra note 298, at 5.
301. Tang, supra note 298, at 5.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 5–6.
304. 1995CONCLUDINGOBSERVATIONS, supra note 23, ¶ 19; JOSEPH&CASTAN,
supra note 23, at 742. For the views taken by subsequent iterations of the Com-
mittee, see infra.
305. Tang, supra note 298, at 5.
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the “progress made” in the enjoyment of ICCPR rights.306 It im-
poses ongoing duties on parties to ensure that all individuals
subject to their respective jurisdictions enjoy ICCPR rights.307
Hence, insofar as it is necessary to consider customary interna-
tional law in interpreting the ICCPR, current customary law re-
garding democracy and democratization is relevant to the inter-
pretation of Article 25(b).308 If there were indeed a right to de-
mocratization as a matter of customary international law, Arti-
cle 25(b) would require a party that has embarked on a process
of democratization to continue with that process. Read in such a
light, once the United Kingdom introduced elected seats to
Legco, its reservation to Article 25(b) could no longer be con-
sistent with the object and purpose of Article 25(b).
The invalidity of the reservation to Article 25(b) would likely
only result in severance of the invalid reservation. The Joint
Declaration and Basic Law both provide that the provisions of
the ICCPR previously in force in relation to Hong Kong shall
continue to apply.309 This is inconsistent with the suggestion
that invalidity of the reservation to Article 25(b) would nullify
all of the provisions of the ICCPR, as applied to Hong Kong.
Thus, in the absence of evidence that the reservation was a fun-
damental condition of the United Kingdom’s assent to the
ICCPR, Article 25(b) applies in full force to Hong Kong, along
with other provisions of the ICCPR.310 The PRC would therefore
be obliged to secure the rights guaranteed by Article 25(b) in re-
spect of Hong Kong, including the right of universal suffrage and
the right to be elected. Any conditions imposed on the exercise
306. ICCPR, supra note 278, art. 40(1).
307. ICCPR, supra note 278, art. 2(1); Human Rights Comm., Gen. Comment
No. 3: Implementation at the National Level, Compilation of General Com-
ments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bod-
ies, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 29, 1994).
308. On the applicable customary international law, see infra Part II,G.
309. Joint Declaration, supra note 61, Annex I, ch. XIII; Basic Law, supra
note 62, art. 39.
310. ILC Guide to Practice, supra note 252, ¶ 4.5.3.
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of these rights must be based on “reasonable and objective crite-
ria.”311 In particular, political or other views are an impermissi-
ble reason for restricting these rights.312 The application of Arti-
cle 25(b) to Hong Kong would therefore be fatal to the notion that
candidates for Chief Executive should be “screened” for ideolog-
ical purity.
Nonetheless, despite its previous position regarding the inap-
plicability of the reservation to Article 25(b), the Human Rights
Committee now appears to accept that the reservation remains
in place. The Concluding Observations issued in 2013 expressed
“concern” about the continuation of the reservation and recom-
mended that the Hong Kong Government “consider steps lead-
ing to withdrawing the reservation to article 25(b) of the Cove-
nant.”313 This represents a marked—and unexplained—depar-
ture from previous Concluding Observations by the Committee,
which maintained that the reservation no longer applied.314 The
Human Rights Committee returned to the issue of voting rights
in Hong Kong on October 23, 2014, in light of the 2014 Deci-
sion. 315 Although the Committee demanded information on
measures taken to withdraw the reservation to article 25(b), it
declared that “universal suffrage” included both the right to vote
311. Human Rights Comm., Gen. Comment No. 25: Article 25 (Participation
in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote): The Right to Participate in Public
Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service, ¶¶ 4,
15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (July 16, 1996) [hereinafter Gen. Com-
ment 25].
312. Id. ¶ 15; ICCPR, supra note 278, art. 2.
313. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic
Report of Hong Kong, China, 107th Sess., Mar. 11–28, 2013, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc.
CCPR C/CHN-HKG/CO/3 (Apr. 29, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 Concluding Obser-
vations].
314. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of
the Human Rights Committee: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(HKSAR), ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/HKG/CO/2 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 Con-
cluding Observations]. The 2013 Concluding Observations made no reference
to the 1999 Concluding Observations. 2013 Concluding Observations, supra
note 313, ¶ 6.
315. UN Human Rights Body to Take Up Hong Kong Voting Rights Issue at
Public Session, STRAITS TIMES, Sept. 10, 2014, http://www.strait-
stimes.com/news/asia/east-asia/story/un-human-rights-body-take-hong-kong-
voting-rights-issue-public-session-201.
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and the right to stand for election.316 It therefore sought further
information on the proposed Chief Executive electoral reforms
and their compatibility with the ICCPR.317
3. Universal Suffrage and the Right to Vote
The Human Rights Committee considers that the right to vote
“should be available to every adult citizen.”318 Thus, states par-
ties are required to “ensure that the broadest pool of voters be
allowed to cast ballots.”319 The exercise of such rights may only
be suspended or excluded as prescribed by law and on objective
and reasonable grounds.320 The ICCPR does not impose any par-
ticular electoral system.321 However, it does not follow that there
are no “international standards” at all (as Li Fei asserted in an-
nouncing the 2014 Decision).322
The Election Committee in its present form does not comply
with the requirement of universal suffrage under Article 25. Nor
is the selection of members of the Election Committee open to all
registered voters in Hong Kong.323 However, the main contro-
versy regarding Chief Executive electoral reform has been that
of nomination, rather than the actual process of choosing be-
tween candidates. General Comment 25 does not prescribe any
particular nomination mechanism or process; it merely requires
that nomination criteria not constitute an unreasonable barrier
to entry.324
316. See Human Rights Comm., Report on Follow-Up to the Concluding Ob-
servations of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/112/2 (2014),
at p. 22.
317. Id.
318. Gen. Comment 25, supra note 311, ¶ 4.
319. Avery Davis-Roberts & David J. Carroll, Using International Law to As-
sess Elections, 17 DEMOCRATIZATION 416, 423 (2010).
320. Gen. Comment 25, supra note 311, ¶ 4.
321. Gen. Comment 25, supra note 311, ¶ 21.
322. See, e.g., Li Fei: NPCSC’s Important Decision on HK, RADIO TELEVISION
H.K., Aug. 31, 2014, http://rthk.hk/rthk/news/english-
news/20140831/news_20140831_56_1033905.htm.
323. Chief Executive Election Ordinance (2001) Cap. 569, 19–27, pt. 2 (H.K.).
324. See infra Part II.E.5.
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4. Equal Suffrage
The ICCPR does not prescribe any particular electoral sys-
tem.325 However, any such system must “give effect to the free
expression of the will of the electors.”326 Thus, although electoral
systems such as electoral college systems are permissible, the
functional constituency system is not. 327 The Human Rights
Committee found that functional constituencies gave “undue
weight to the views of the business community” and therefore,
contravened the equal suffrage requirement of Article 25.328
The Election Committee’s composition is, in essence, the func-
tional constituency system writ large. It privileges the views of
social sectors “deemed to be friendly to Beijing,” such as the com-
mercial and agricultural sectors, at the expense of sectors con-
sidered politically hostile.329 Any retention of the Election Com-
mittee as an electoral body will therefore violate Article 25.
5. The Right to Be Elected
Although General Comment 25 does not prescribe a specific
nomination mechanism or process, it does not follow that it is
silent on issues relating to nomination.330 In paragraphs 15–17
of General Comment 25, the Human Rights Committee empha-
sized that limits on the right to stand for election can only be
325. See Gen. Comment 25, supra note 311, ¶ 21.
326. Id.
327. JOSEPH&CASTAN, supra note 23, at 742.
328. Id.
329. Keith Bradsher, Beijing Switches Sides in the Race for Hong Kong’s
Chief Executive, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2012, http://www.ny-
times.com/2012/03/22/world/asia/beijing-switches-support-in-race-for-hong-
kong-chief.html; Te-Ping Chen, Meet Hong Kong’s Voters—All 1,200 of Them,
CHINA REAL TIME (Mar. 19, 2012, 10:22 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/china-
realtime/2012/03/19/meet-hong-kong%E2%80%99s-voters-all-1200-of-them/.
As of 2012, members of the Election Committee included 241 members of pro-
Beijing political parties, Hong Kong deputies to the National People’s Con-
gress, Hong Kong members of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference, and members of the New Territories Heung
Yee Kuk (representing the interests of indigenous villagers in the New Terri-
tories). Id.
330. Qiang Shigong has asserted that the ICCPR is silent on issues of nomi-
nation, but without apparent reference to General Comment 25. See Shigong
Qiang, The ICCPR in Hong Kong: The Misinterpreted International Treaty, su-
pra note 229.
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based on “objective and reasonable criteria.” In particular, it
stated that political affiliation was not a permissible ground for
barring a person from standing for election. Nor may states re-
quire candidates to be members of parties or of specific par-
ties.331
The Human Rights Committee considered discrimination on
the ground of political opinion in Bwalya v. Zambia (314/1988).
Bwalya, a Zambian national, ran for a parliamentary seat as a
member of an opposition party. The Zambian authorities sub-
jected him to threats and intimidation, expelled him and his
family from their home, and detained him for belonging to a po-
litical party banned under Zambia’s one-party Constitution. The
Human Rights Committee found that Zambia had violated Arti-
cle 25.332 More recently, in a series of cases concerning Belarus’
system of registering electoral candidates, the Committee held
that arbitrary denial of registration, and denial of registration
to candidates whose registrations appeared to be lawful, violated
Article 25.333
However, even the Human Rights Committee has recognized
that some political affiliations are beyond the pale; it has taken
the view that Article 25 permitted a ban on far-right parties. It
justified such a ban by invoking Article 5(1), under which groups
aiming to undermine or destroy the ICCPR rights of others can-
not avail themselves of the ICCPR.334 The exception to the prin-
ciple that candidacy cannot be refused on grounds of political af-
filiation is therefore a narrow one. Any attempt by the PRC to
exclude pro-democracy politicians from candidacy for Chief Ex-
ecutive would not fall within the exception.335
331. Gen. Comment 25, supra note 311, ¶¶ 15–17.
332. Chiiko Bwalya v. Zambia, ¶¶ 6.6 & 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/314/1988
(1993); JOSEPH&CASTAN, supra note 23, at 745.
333. See Lukyanchik v. Belarus, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/97/D/1392/2005
(2009); Sudalenko v. Belarus, ¶ 6.7, U.N. Doc. CCP R/C/100/D/1354/2005
(2010) respectively. See also JOSEPH & CASTAN, supra note 23, at 745–46. De-
nial of registration meant that a person could not legally become a candidate.
Id.
334. JOSEPH&CASTAN, supra note 23, at 746.
335. But not for want of trying. See Chen Zuoer: Will Not Befriend “Traitors,
Separatists”, supra note 4 (comparing democrats to “terrorists”).
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F. The Right to Self-Determination
Academic and lay observers have at various times suggested
that the right to self-determination applies to Hong Kong.336 The
circumstances of Hong Kong’s removal from the list of Non-Self
Governing Territories in 1972 suggest two possible explana-
tions. The first is that the right of the Hong Kong people to self-
determination was violated by the PRC, with the connivance of
the United Kingdom.337 The second is that the lease of the New
Territories, coupled with the largely ethnic Chinese population
of the territory, warrant the setting aside of self-determina-
tion.338 Regardless of which view is correct, the issue of self-de-
termination for Hong Kong—at least insofar as it encompasses
external self-determination—is now politically unfeasible.339
G. A Right to Democracy in Customary International Law?
In the event that ICCPR Article 25(b) does not apply to Hong
Kong, it falls to consider the extent to which customary interna-
tional law protects a right to democratic participation. Neither
the UDHR, nor any other evidence of customary international
law, provides a strong foundation for any obligation by the PRC
to democratize Hong Kong. Nineteen years after Professor
Thomas Franck referred to an “emerging right to democratic
336. See generally Patricia A. Dagati, Hong Kong’s Lost Right to Self-Deter-
mination: A Denial of Due Process in the United Nations, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L
&COMP. L. 153 (1992); John W. Head, Selling Hong Kong to China: What Hap-
pened to the Right of Self-Determination, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 283 (1997); Wil-
liam Pfaff, Why Not Support Self-Determination For Hong Kong?, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 2, 1990, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1990-02-
02/news/9001090967_1_hong-kong-tiananmen-square-china.
337. See Dagati, supra note 336, at 154–55; Head, supra note 336, at 298–
304.
338. ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL
REAPPRAISAL 79–80 (1995) [hereinafter CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION]. De-
spite widespread disillusion with the Central Government in Hong Kong after
the Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989, the ascent of assertive nativism in
Hong Kong did not begin until well after 1997. See Veg, supra note 83.
339. Head, supra note 336, at 304. See generally Robert W. McGee & Danny
Kin-Kong Lam, Hong Kong’s Option to Secede, 33 HARV. INT’L L.J. 427 (1992).
Nonetheless, there has been a revival of academic and popular discussion of
whether Hong Kongers are a “people” entitled to self-determination. See, e.g.,
Cheung Sze-tsai, 香港是否應有民族自決的權利? [Should Hong Kong Have the
Right to Self-Determination?], UNDERGRAD (H.K.), Feb. 2014.
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governance,”340 the right has not yet become consolidated as a
norm of customary international law.341 Even if such a norm has
come into being, the PRC would be considered a persistent ob-
jector.342
Under Article 21(3) of the UDHR, “[t]he will of the people shall
be the basis of the authority of government,” as expressed in “pe-
riodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage.” 343 When the UDHR was first drafted and
adopted, it was treated as a non-binding instrument. 344 Alt-
hough many of its norms are now considered binding as a matter
of customary international law,345 it is doubtful that a right to
democracy per se—as formulated in Article 21(3) of the UDHR
or otherwise—has attained the status of customary interna-
tional law.346
However, there may be sufficient evidence to support a princi-
ple of “democratic teleology”—a right to democratization, rather
340. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. INT’L L. 46 (1992).
341. Professor Greg Fox, one of the more optimistic commentators on the
emerging right to democracy, acknowledges that continued disagreement over
its substantive content, as well as disparate observance of the norm, have “lim-
ited the emergence of a right to democracy in customary or conventional law.”
Greg Fox, Democracy, Right to, International Protection, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L LAW ¶¶ 35–37, http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL
(enter title as search term) (last visited Oct. 6, 2013). The late Professor
Cassese referred, in 2005, to such a norm as “[p]robably . . . currently in the
process of coming into being.” ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 395 (2d
ed. 2005). But see Niels Petersen, Elections, Right to Participate in, Interna-
tional Protection, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L LAW ¶¶ 17–18,
http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL (enter title as search term) (last visited Oct.
4, 2013) (expressing skepticism as to the existence of opinio juris and sufficient
supporting state practice). See also Susan Marks, What has Become of the
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance?, 22 EUR. J. INT’LL. 507, 511 (2011);
Jean d’Aspremont, The Rise and Fall of Democracy Governance in Interna-
tional Law: A Reply to Susan Marks, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 549 (2011).
342. d’Aspremont, supra note 341, at 557. Professor d’Aspremont suggests
that the rise of the PRC as a world power has helped to undermine the emer-
gence of the norm altogether, by enticing emerging democracies with the prom-
ise of cooperation without ideological baggage. Id. at 562–63.
343. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 21(3),
U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).
344. Davis-Roberts & Carroll, supra note 319, at 421.
345. Id.
346. Petersen, supra note 341, ¶¶ 17–18.
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than a right to democracy.347 Dr. Niels Petersen, writing in the
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, identifies
a series of General Assembly resolutions entitled “Enhancing
the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elec-
tions.”348 Resolutions prior to 1992 consisted mainly of norma-
tive statements, implying the existence of a right to democ-
racy.349 Subsequent resolutions focused on electoral assistance
provided by the Secretariat.350 The latter set of resolutions refer
to the “continuation and consolidation of the democratization
process” or to efforts to “consolidate and regularize the achieve-
ments of previous elections.”351 Petersen cites the teleological
connotations of the words “promoting” and “consolidating” as
supporting the idea of a duty to develop toward democracy.352
This idea finds further support in a separate series of General
Assembly resolutions. Following General Assembly Resolution
55/96 on Promoting and Consolidating Democracy,353 the Gen-
eral Assembly passed a series of resolutions on the promotion
and consolidation of new or restored democracies.354 Some of
347. Id. ¶ 22.
348. Id. ¶ 20.
349. See G.A. Res. 43/157, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/157 (Dec. 8, 1988); G.A. Res.
44/146, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/146 (Dec. 15, 1989); G.A. Res. 45/150, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/45/150 (Dec. 18, 1990); and G.A. Res. 46/137, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/137
(Dec. 17, 1991). Petersen argues that none of the resolutions in question ex-
pressly confers a right to vote in elections. Petersen, supra note 341, ¶ 20.
350. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 47/138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/138 (Dec. 18, 1992); G.A.
Res. 48/131, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/131 (Dec. 20, 1993); G.A. Res. 49/190, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/49/190 (Dec. 23, 1994); G.A. Res. 50/185, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/185
(Dec. 22, 1995); G.A. Res. 52/129, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/129 (Dec. 12, 1997); G.A.
Res. 54/173, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/173 (Dec. 17, 1999); G.A. Res. 56/159, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/56/159 (Dec. 19, 2001); G.A. Res. 58/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/180
(Dec. 22, 2003); G.A. Res. 60/162, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/162 (Dec. 16, 2005); G.A.
Res. 62/150, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/150 (Dec. 18, 2007); G.A. Res. 64/155, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/64/155 (Dec. 18, 2009); G.A. Res. 66/163, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/163
(Dec. 19, 2011). See also Petersen, supra note 341, ¶ 20.
351. Id.
352. Petersen, supra note 341, ¶ 20.
353. G.A. Res. 55/96, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/96 (Dec. 4, 2000).
354. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 56/96, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/96 (Dec. 14, 2001); G.A.
Res. 58/13, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/13 (Nov. 17, 2003); G.A. Res. 60/253, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/253 (May 2, 2006); G.A. Res. 62/7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/7 (Nov. 8,
2007); G.A. Res. 64/12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/12 (Nov. 9, 2009); and G.A. Res.
66/285, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/285 (Jul. 3, 2012).
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these resolutions contain language suggesting that states are
under a duty to democratize.355
State practice may also support a duty to democratize. Pe-
tersen, citing mechanisms within the OAS and the AU to sanc-
tion unconstitutional removal of elected governments, suggests
that “[i]nternational practice is . . . principally directed against
setbacks in the democratization process.”356 The European Com-
mission’s threat of proceedings against Hungary 357 and the Eu-
ropean Union’s suspension of association agreement negotia-
tions with Ukraine358 may provide further evidence of an inter-
national norm against democratic “back-sliding.”
H. Breaches of Public International Law
Sections A to G of this Part considered the PRC’s obligations
under the Joint Declaration, the ICCPR, and customary inter-
national law. This section argues that the PRC’s history of ob-
structing democratic development in Hong Kong, as set out in
Part I of this article, violates these obligations.
1. The Joint Declaration
The question of whether the PRC’s obstruction of Hong Kong’s
democratization violates the Joint Declaration hinges on the in-
terpretation of the Joint Declaration. Both the United Kingdom
and the PRC adopt the rules set out in Article 31 of the VCLT on
treaty interpretation. Thus, any interpretation of the Joint Dec-
laration must consider:
(1) The requirement of good faith;
(2) The ordinary meaning of its provisions in context;
355. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 64/12, supra note 354 and G.A. Res. 66/285, supra
note 354.
356. Petersen, supra note 341, ¶ 21.
357. Gergely Szakacs, Hungary Backtracks on Contested Reforms After EU
Pressure, REUTERS, Sept. 17, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2013/09/17/us-hungary-constitution-idUSBRE98G0DV20130917. Contra
Kristina Jovanovski, Hungary Dodges “Democracy” Surveillance, AL-JAZEERA,
Jun. 26, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/fea-
tures/2013/06/201362612313956611.html.
358. See Andrew E. Kramer, European Union Suspends Trade Talks With
Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2013, http://www.ny-
times.com/2013/12/16/world/europe/ukraine-protests.html.
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(3) Its object and purpose;
(4) Subsequent agreements regarding its interpreta-
tion or application;
(5) Subsequent practice establishing the parties’ agree-
ment regarding its interpretation; and
(6) Other rules of public international law governing
Sino-British relations.359
As the travaux préparatoires of the Joint Declaration have not
yet been made public, Article 32 of the VCLT has limited rele-
vance.360
On its face, the Joint Declaration merely requires “elections”
or “consultation,” before appointing the Chief Executive. The
Joint Declaration does not itself define “elections.” However, the
interpretive criteria in Article 31 of the VCLT militate against
restrictions on the electoral process. First, any interpretation of
“elections” or “consultation” that allows a merely formal process
of “election” or “consultation” would denude these terms of
meaning. An “election” in which only one man had one vote, for
example, would be consistent neither with the requirements of
good faith, nor with the ordinary meaning of the word “election.”
An expansive interpretation is also consistent with the object
and purpose of the Joint Declaration. One of the main purposes
of the Joint Declaration was to secure a “high degree of auton-
omy” for Hong Kong, except in foreign affairs and defense. Any
attempt at “watering down” the involvement of the Hong Kong
public in electing the Chief Executive would frustrate the pur-
pose of securing autonomy to Hong Kong after 1997.
Further, to the extent that the United Kingdom has acquiesced
to the Basic Law, Article 45 may be treated as subsequent prac-
tice in the application of the Joint Declaration.361 That Article
requires a “broadly representative nominating committee” and
elections by “universal suffrage.” These terms should be given
their ordinary meaning.
359. See supra pp. 40–41.
360. See Yash Ghai, The Intersection of Chinese Law and Common Law in
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: Question of Technique or Poli-
tics?, 37(2) H.K.L.J. 363, 387 (2007) (travaux préparatoires of Joint Declaration
and Basic Law protected by Chinese secrecy laws).
361. See PATTEN, supra note 66, at 32–33. Xiao Weiyun states that the obli-
gation to enact the Basic Law stems from the Joint Declaration. See XIAO, su-
pra note 235, at 13.
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Lastly, other applicable rules of public international law point
toward an expansive interpretation of “elections.” The term
“elections” is not defined in the Joint Declaration. However,
China has succeeded to the United Kingdom’s obligations relat-
ing to Hong Kong under the ICCPR; its provisions, for reasons
set out above, are also relevant to the election of the Chief Exec-
utive.
Further, rules of customary international law—in particular,
emerging norms regarding democratization—are also relevant
to interpretation of the Joint Declaration. The following factors
in the Joint Declaration suggest that the parties intended “elec-
tions” to have an ambulatory meaning:
(1) The absence of a specific definition of “elections”;
(2) Under Article 3(12), the PRC has committed itself
to maintaining its basic policies for 50 years after the
establishment of the Hong Kong SAR, i.e. it is under
ongoing obligations with respect to Hong Kong; and
(3) China described its “basic policies” in general terms,
the implementation of which will necessarily be con-
text-sensitive.362
In that light, current or recent rules of customary interna-
tional law in favor of democratization should also shape the in-
terpretation of the Joint Declaration. Read in light of the ICCPR
and current rules of customary international law, the word “elec-
tions” in the Joint Declaration must admit of a substantive
meaning, rather than a merely formal one. Restrictions on the
electoral process by manipulating nomination criteria would
render the term “elections” nugatory. They are therefore incon-
sistent with the PRC’s obligations under the Joint Declaration.
This argument is not universally accepted, even by advocates
of Hong Kong’s democratization.363 But the Chinese and Hong
362. See supra p. 41.
363. In his evidence before the U.K. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee, Lord Patten described this argument as “pretty heavy duty and pretty
unfair.” Lord Patten of Barnes, Evidence Given to the House of Commons For-
eign Affairs Committee, Nov. 4, 2014, http://data.parliament.uk/written-
evidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-commit-
tee/the-uks-relations-with-hong-kong-30-years-after-the-joint-declara-
tion/oral/15097.html. Similarly, in her evidence before that Committee, Demo-
cratic Party legislator Emily Lau declined to identify a specific provision of the
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Kong governments have gone much further than merely arguing
over interpretation, instead seeking to contest the Joint Decla-
ration’s continued validity. In response to an inquiry into the
implementation of the Joint Declaration by the U.K. House of
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (“FAC”), Ni Jian, China’s
Deputy Ambassador to the United Kingdom, claimed that the
Joint Declaration lapsed with the transfer of sovereignty in
1997.364 Hong Kong’s Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland
Affairs, Raymond Tam, echoed these sentiments. In response to
a question from a Hong Kong legislator, Tam asserted that the
Joint Declaration’s provisions “have been fully implemented,
and its purpose and objectives have also been fully fulfilled.”365
In response to further legislative questioning, Tam went even
further—arguing that China’s “basic policies” in Article 3 were
a unilateral declaration by China,366 implying that they had no
binding effect.
Neither of these arguments withstands scrutiny. The notion
that the Joint Declaration lapsed in 1997 flatly contradicts the
50-year entrenchment of China’s “basic policies.”367 It also ig-
nores other provisions in the Joint Declaration that survived the
transfer of sovereignty in 1997, such as those regarding the Sino-
British Joint Liaison Group.368 Although Tam’s argument re-
garding Article 3 being a unilateral declaration is ingenious, it
does not survive a context-sensitive reading of Article 3. Under
Joint Declaration that had been breached with respect to Chief Executive elec-
toral arrangements. Emily Lau, Evidence Given to the House of Commons For-
eign Affairs Committee, Dec. 18, 2014, http://data.parliament.uk/written-
evidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-commit-
tee/the-uks-relations-with-hong-kong-30-years-after-the-joint-declara-
tion/oral/16902.html.
364. See 2 Dec. 2014, PARL. DEB., H.C. (2014) 164 (U.K.) (speech by Sir Rich-
ard Ottaway MP, Chairman of the FAC). See
also陳佐洱：英對「一國兩制」無監督權 [Chen Zuoer: UK has No Supervisory
Powers Over “One Country, Two Systems”], WENWEIPO (H.K.), Dec. 15, 2014,
http://paper.wenweipo.com/2014/12/15/HK1412150006.htm (asserting that the
“theme” of the Joint Declaration had been accomplished in 1997).
365. Press Release, H.K. Gov’t, LCQ5: The Joint Declaration on the Question
of Hong Kong (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/gen-
eral/201412/17/P201412170731.htm.
366. 譚志源：50年不變英無權監督 [Raymond Tam: UK Has No Supervisory
Authority Over “Unchanged for 50 Years”], MINGPAO (H.K.), Dec. 18, 2014.
367. Joint Declaration, supra note 61, art. 3(12) & Annex I, ch. I.
368. Id., Annex II.
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Article 8, the entirety of the Joint Declaration–along with all of
its Annexes–are equally binding.369 Although the invocation of
international law by Beijing and Hong Kong officialdom marks
a welcome departure from bluster over “color revolutions” and
“external forces,”370 the arguments that have emerged are nei-
ther legally nor logically sound.
2. The ICCPR
If one accepts that the Joint Declaration remains in place and
that the reservation to Article 25(b) has been severed, the
method of selection of the Chief Executive in 2017 must comply
with the requirements of Article 25(b). Article 25(b) must be in-
terpreted in accordance with the principle of effectiveness.371
Thus, the right of universal suffrage, the right to vote, equality
of suffrage, and the right to be elected must be interpreted as
conferring substantive rights on Hong Kong residents, not
merely formal rights.372
The PRC seeks to maintain control over the nomination of
Chief Executives. These proposed restrictions directly impinge
upon the right to be elected. That right may only be restricted
based on objective and reasonable criteria. Subject only to the
limited exception in Article 5(1) of the ICCPR, affiliation with a
political party or political opinion are criteria that are neither
objective nor reasonable. As Qiao Xiaoyang candidly admitted,
the filtering of candidates for Chief Executive by the criterion of
“non-confrontation” with Beijing does not admit of objective def-
inition.373 The use of political criteria in “filtering” candidates
therefore infringes Article 25(b).374
369. Id., art. 8.
370. See, e.g., Nectar Gan & Stuart Lau, Occupy Central Was an Attempt at
Colour Revolution: PLA General, S. CHINAMORNING POST (H.K.), Mar. 3, 2015,
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1728027/occupy-central-was-at-
tempt-colour-revolution-pla-general (referring to “external forces” who “or-
chestrated a Hong Kong version of a colour revolution”).
371. See supra Part II.E.1.
372. See supra pp. 57–60.
373. Qiao, supra note 19.
374. As the Human Rights Committee has stated, “political opinion may not
be used as a ground to deprive any person of the right to stand for election.”
Gen. Comment 25, supra note 311, ¶ 17.
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The question of civil nomination is slightly less clear-cut. On
its face, Article 25 requires only that the nomination process not
constitute an unreasonable barrier to candidates. Neither Arti-
cle 25, nor General Comment 25, offers guidance as to the me-
chanics of the nomination process. This raises the question of
whether the Hong Kong public has a “right to nominate” under
Article 25. Maria Tam and Suzanne Pepper have suggested that
it does not.375 However, for other electoral rights to be effective,
voters must have a free choice of candidates.376 As Professor
Benny Tai (戴耀廷), a founder of Occupy Central, observed, a
choice between a rotten apple and a rotten orange is no choice at
all.377
3. Customary International Law
The PRC has opted to implement the Joint Declaration by ap-
pointing a Chief Executive after “elections,” rather than after
consultations. It has also declared in the Basic Law that the “ul-
timate aim” is the election of the Chief Executive by universal
suffrage. Even as a matter of customary international law, the
PRC is arguably under a duty not to engage in acts that would
undermine democratic development in the SAR—and perhaps a
positive duty to democratize Hong Kong. Thus, it would no
longer be open to the PRC to adopt a system of appointing the
Chief Executive after only conducting local consultations, not-
withstanding the provisions of the Joint Declaration.
III. REMEDIES
Breaches of duty mean little without remedies. Unfortunately
for Hong Kong, there are few effective remedies for the PRC’s
breaches of public international law. Members of the Hong Kong
public have no standing to enforce China’s duties under custom-
ary international law; the United Kingdom or other States could
only enforce such duties if they are obligations erga omnes. Nei-
ther the ICCPR, nor the Joint Declaration, provides for dispute
375. Lau & Lee, supra note 295; Pepper, Exploring the Options, supra note
200. I refer here to the right to nominate, not the right to be nominated.
376. Gen. Comment 25, supra note 311, ¶ 15.
377. Lau & Lee, supra note 295. On the issue of genuine choice, see also
Monty Python’s Flying Circus (BBC television broadcast Dec. 15, 1970), avail-
able at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M_eYSuPKP3Y (the Spam sketch).
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resolution mechanisms that apply to Hong Kong. Nor has the
PRC accepted ICJ compulsory jurisdiction.
A. The Joint Declaration
The Joint Declaration contains no provisions for enforcement.
It would not be open to the United Kingdom to withdraw from
the Joint Declaration; the treaty establishes a boundary and
therefore, falls within the proviso under Article 62(2)(a) of the
VCLT barring withdrawal due to a fundamental change in cir-
cumstances.378 Although the PRC’s stated “basic policies” will
purportedly remain unchanged over fifty years, the PRC has ve-
hemently resisted any attempts by the United Kingdom to hold
the PRC to its promises.379 An early skirmish in 1996 suggests
that the prospects for arbitration or adjudication are bleak. In
response to the PRC’s unilateral decision to replace the Legco
members elected in 1995 with a “provisional legislature” se-
lected by a 400-member Selection Committee (itself chosen by
the PRC), then Foreign-Secretary Malcolm Rifkind threatened
to refer the establishment of the provisional legislature to the
ICJ. 380 His Chinese counterpart, Qian Qichen, brusquely re-
sponded that it was “futile” to “play the ‘international card.’”381
B. The ICCPR
Although individuals may not enforce the PRC’s obligations
with respect to Hong Kong under the ICCPR, it is open to other
parties to the ICCPR to do so. On May 17, 1976, the U.K. Gov-
ernment made a declaration under Article 41 of the ICCPR that
it recognized the competence of the Human Rights Committee to
receive and consider communications submitted by other States
parties that had also made Article 41 declarations at least
378. Lorenz Langer, Out of Joint?—Hong Kong’s International Status From
the Sino-British Joint Declaration to the Present, 46 ARCH. VÖLKERRECHTS 309,
336 (2008).
379. See, e.g., Todd Crowell & Law Siu Lan, Tale of Two Legislatures,
ASIAWEEK (Jan. 10, 1997), http://www-
cgi.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/97/0110/nat7.html; Chong & Lau, supra note
7.
380. HERSCHENSOHN, supra note 29, at 21.
381. Crowell & Law, supra note 379.
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twelve months before the date of the submitted communica-
tions.382 Article 41 continues to apply to Hong Kong by virtue of
Annex III, Chapter XIV of the Joint Declaration, and Article 39
of the Basic Law.383 However, proceedings under Article 41 do
not result in legally binding judgments.384
C. Customary International Law: Obligations Erga Omnes?
The PRC’s obligations under customary law in respect of Hong
Kong are only enforceable by third States if they are obligations
erga omnes. The ICJ defined obligations erga omnes in the sem-
inal Barcelona Traction case (Second Phase), when considering
whether Belgium had standing to sue on behalf of shareholders
of a company incorporated in Canada that had been declared
bankrupt by a Spanish court. The ICJ held that Belgium lacked
standing. However, it held (in obiter dicta) that there was a dis-
tinction between obligations owed vis-a-vis other States in the
field of diplomatic protection, and obligations erga omnes—obli-
gations “towards the international community as a whole” and
which were “the concern of all States.” 385 Such obligations de-
rived from the prohibition of “acts of aggression, and of genocide,
as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights
of the human person, including protection from slavery and ra-
cial discrimination.” Obligations erga omnes also arose from “in-
ternational instruments of a universal or quasi-universal char-
acter.”386
The ICJ held that the obligation to respect a people’s right to
self-determination is an obligation erga omnes in the Palestine
Wall and East Timor cases.387 In the East Timor case, Portugal,
the former colonial power in East Timor, brought proceedings
against Australia, challenging the latter’s Timor Gap Treaty
382. Status of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra
note 279.
383. Joint Declaration, supra note 61, Annex I, ch. XIII; Basic Law, supra
note 62, art. 39.
384. See JOSEPH&CASTAN, supra note 23, at 22–23.
385. Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company, Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5).
386. Id. ¶ 34.
387. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pal-
estinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶¶ 155–56 (July 9); East
Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, ¶ 29 (1995).
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with Indonesia. Portugal alleged that Indonesia had no author-
ity to negotiate the treaty as it had illegally invaded East Timor
in 1975 and subsequently occupied it illegally. Portugal further
alleged that the treaty violated the right of the people of East
Timor to self-determination. The ICJ declined to rule on the law-
fulness of Indonesia’s conduct, but held that Portugal’s submis-
sion that the right to self-determination was assertable erga om-
nes was “irreproachable.”388 In the Palestine Wall case, the U.N.
General Assembly sought an advisory opinion regarding the le-
gal consequences of Israel’s construction of a wall through the
occupied West Bank to prevent would-be attackers from enter-
ing Israel. The General Assembly made the request after the
United States vetoed a draft Security Council resolution con-
demning the wall. The ICJ held that the wall amounted to de
facto annexation of the West Bank and that the wall, along with
related measures, severely impeded the Palestinian people’s
right to self-determination.389
However, the relevance of the right to self-determination to
Hong Kong is questionable. Although the existence of a “people”
deserving of a right to self-determination has often been as-
sumed without discussion, there is still no generally agreed-
upon definition of the term “people.”390 As Professor Cassese ob-
served, the population of Hong Kong has remained largely Chi-
nese in ethnic composition.391 On the other hand, University of
Hong Kong survey data has shown that, with few exceptions,
more respondents have identified as “Hongkongers” or
“Hongkongers in China” than as “Chinese” or “Chinese in Hong
Kong” since August 1997.392 Although earlier data is not availa-
ble, proponents of a distinct Hong Kong identity have grown
more assertive after 1997.393 Nonetheless, the factual basis for
388. East Timor, supra note 387, ¶¶ 28–29.
389. Palestine Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 387, ¶¶ 121–22.
390. Daniel Thürer & Thomas Burri, Self-Determination, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIAOFPUB. INT’LLAW¶18, http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL (enter
title as search term) (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
391. CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 338, at 79–80.
392. Ethnic Identity Poll, HKU POP SITE, http://hkupop.hku.hk/eng-
lish/popexpress/ethnic/eidentity/poll/datatables.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2013).
393. Veg, supra note 83.
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referring to Hong Kong’s population as a distinct “people” re-
mains uncertain.
The right to democratization is on shakier ground still. The
Barcelona Traction case suggests that obligations deriving from
basic human rights may be obligations erga omnes, yet it offers
no guidance as to how to identify specific rights that give rise to
obligations erga omnes. No consensus has emerged in academic
literature. Although Professor Christian Tams identifies a “core
of obligations erga omnes” deriving from peremptory norms of
international law, he concedes that identifying obligations erga
omnes outside of jus cogens is “considerably more difficult.”394
Similarly, Dr Maurizio Ragazzi identified five common elements
of existing obligations erga omnes, but added that they were not
rigid prescriptive criteria.395 It is therefore unclear whether the
right to democratization—if it exists at all—gives rise to an erga
omnes obligation to respect that right.
D. Means of Enforcement
Three main difficulties arise with respect to enforcement: the
absence of any individual right of petition, the PRC’s refusal to
accept ICJ jurisdiction, and the issue of how obligations erga om-
nes should be enforced.
1. Absence of Individual Right of Petition
Traditionally, public international law only recognized States
as actors; individuals enjoyed no rights under international law
and were not subject to duties under it.396 To bring claims before
international judicial bodies, individuals had to persuade the
government of their home State to bring a claim in the exercise
of diplomatic protection.397 Although individual access to judicial
proceedings is now available in specific fields, such as interna-
tional human rights and international commercial arbitration,
individual access is a creature of international treaties and is
394. CHRISTIAN J. TAMS, ENFORCING OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 156–57 (2005).
395. THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN
BROWNLIE 474–76 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon eds., 1999).
396. Simone Gorski, Individuals in International Law, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’LLAW ¶ 1, http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL (enter
title as search term) (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
397. Id. ¶ 19.
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not universal.398 None of the treaty-created exceptions to the
customary rule apply to Hong Kong. The PRC is not a party to
the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which provides for in-
dividual complaints to the Human Rights Committee. 399 It
would therefore fall to the United Kingdom to enforce the PRC’s
duties under the Joint Declaration. Alternatively, the United
Kingdom—or a third State—could enforce the PRC’s obligations
under the ICCPR, or its obligations erga omnes under customary
international law.
2. The PRC’s Refusal to Accept ICJ Jurisdiction
The PRC has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
ICJ. It has also entered a reservation to Article 66 of the VCLT,
providing for references of treaty disputes to the ICJ, arbitra-
tion, or conciliation. Nor is China likely to accept voluntary ICJ
jurisdiction in any dispute with the United Kingdom regarding
implementation of the Joint Declaration or of the ICCPR. The
PRC has jealously guarded control over Hong Kong, viewing it
as an internal matter;400 any request by the United Kingdom for
arbitration or litigation would likely be viewed as impinging on
the PRC’s sovereignty. The PRC has long rejected forms of dis-
pute resolution involving a neutral third party in matters involv-
ing its sovereignty, most recently with respect to the Philippines’
request for arbitration of the East Philippine Sea / South China
Sea dispute.401 It will likely adopt a similar approach with re-
spect to Hong Kong, as it did in 1996 in the provisional legisla-
ture dispute.402
398. Id. ¶¶ 25–26.
399. Status of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://trea-
ties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&lang=en
(last visited Dec. 30, 2013).
400. Chong & Lau, supra note 7.
401. Embassy of China in Phil., Chinese Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Remarks
on China Returned the Philippines’ Notification on the Submission of South
China Sea Issue to International Arbitration (Feb. 19, 2013) http://ph.china-
embassy.org/eng/xwfb/t1014903.htm.
402. See supra Part III.A.
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3. Difficulty in Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes
TheBarcelona Traction case suggests that obligations deriving
from basic human rights may be obligations erga omnes, yet it
also states that human rights instruments do not confer on
States the capacity to protect victims of human rights infringe-
ment regardless of nationality.403 In the Palestine Wall case the
ICJ held that, as far as self-determination was concerned, all
States were under several primary obligations. First, States
could not recognize the illegal situation resulting from the Is-
raeli wall. Second, States could not render aid or assistance in
maintaining that situation. Third, States were bound to ensure
(within the limits of the U.N. Charter and international law)
that any impediment to the Palestinian people’s right to self-de-
termination is brought to an end.404
Thus, although it would likely not be open to a third State to
challenge the PRC’s conduct in respect of Hong Kong before the
ICJ, it may be open to such a State to encourage the PRC to com-
ply with its obligations erga omnes in respect of Hong Kong by
other means.405
4. Potential Solutions
These difficulties are not insurmountable. Despite Chinese in-
transigence, it may nonetheless be possible to exert pressure on
China to comply with its international law obligations in respect
of Hong Kong through unilateral conduct by the United King-
dom or through attempts to refer the underlying legal issues to
the ICJ. Enforcement by third States may also be possible, inso-
far as the PRC has breached obligations which are erga omnes
in nature.
First, the United Kingdom could, of its own motion, publicly
monitor the PRC’s compliance with the Joint Declaration,406 and
403. Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company, Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 91 (Feb. 5).
404. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pal-
estinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 159 (Jul. 9).
405. See infra Part III.D.4.
406. Lord Patten of Barnes has publicly argued that the United Kingdom is
“honour bound to speak up for Hong Kong.” Chris Patten, Britain is Honour
Bound to Speak Up For Hong Kong, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 2, 2014,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6458d53c-328c-11e4-93c6-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3IKVOqmcC.
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engage in retorsion or countermeasures in response to Chinese
breach.407 The FCO has prepared six-monthly reports to Parlia-
ment on the implementation of the Joint Declaration since July
1997; continued six-monthly reports by the FCO, as well as pub-
lic statements similar to Hugo Swire’s statement on September
14, 2013, could help draw attention to the PRC’s continued de-
linquency over Hong Kong’s democratic development. However,
to date, the FCO has shown minimal interest in doing so. Its
most recent report, issued in February 2015, maintained that
“the best way to preserve Hong Kong’s strengths is through a
transition to universal suffrage, which delivers a genuine choice
for the people of Hong Kong.”408 Regrettably, this language is
much weaker than that in earlier reports. The FCO’s July 2013
report, for instance, insisted that Hong Kong’s stability and
prosperity were best guaranteed by “moving to a democratic sys-
tem of universal suffrage in line with public consultations, the
promised timetable and international standards.”409 In a similar
vein to the February 2015 report, the FCO’s initial response to
the 2014 Decision, issued on September 4, 2014, stated merely
that there was “no perfect model” for universal suffrage and as-
serted that the details were for the Hong Kong and Central Gov-
ernments and the people of Hong Kong to decide.410 Audrey Eu
tartly responded that it would have been preferable for the FCO
to say nothing at all.411
407. On retorsion and countermeasures, see generally James R. Crawford,
State Responsibility, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L LAW,
http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL (enter title as search term) (last visited
Mar. 3, 2015) and Thomas Giegerich, Retorsion, inMAXPLANCKENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUB. INT’L LAW, http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL (enter title as search
term) (last visited Mar. 3, 2015).
408. FOREIGN&COMMONWEALTHOFFICE, THESIX-MONTHLYREPORT ONHONG
KONG: 1 JULY TO 31 DECEMBER 2014, at 2 (2015).
409. Id. at 8.
410. Press Release, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreign Office Re-
sponds to Hong Kong Reform Plans (Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/gov-
ernment/news/foreign-office-responds-to-hong-kong-reform-plans.
411. Letter from Audrey Eu, Chairman, Civic Party, to Caroline Wilson, Con-
sul-General, British Consulate-General, H.K. (Sept. 5, 2014),
http://www.post852.com/ (enter “not to speak at all” as search term).
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In the absence of resolute action from the FCO, Parliament has
stepped in. In 2014 the FAC launched its own inquiry into im-
plementation of the Joint Declaration.412 Despite being barred
from entering Hong Kong,413 the FAC finished obtaining oral ev-
idence in January 2015,414 and published its report on March 6,
2015.415 In its report, the FAC roundly criticized the FCO for its
412. See The UK’s Relations With Hong Kong: 30 Years After Joint Declara-
tion, PARLIAMENT.UK (July 22, 2014), http://www.parliament.uk/business/com-
mittees/committees-a-z/commons-select/foreign-affairs-committee/news/hong-
kong-tor/. The author submitted written evidence to the FAC inquiry: Written
Evidence From Alvin Y.H. Cheung (HNG0270), Oct. 2014, http://data.parlia-
ment.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-
affairs-committee/the-uks-relations-with-hong-kong-30-years-after-the-joint-
declaration/written/13380.html.
413. See FCO Should Summon Chinese Ambassador, Says Committee,
PARLIAMENT.UK (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.parliament.uk/business/commit-
tees/committees-a-z/commons-select/foreign-affairs-committee/news/report-
hong-kong-visit-ban/. The Chinese decision to prevent the FAC from visiting
Hong Kong is arguably in breach of the Joint Declaration, which provides that
Hong Kong may exercise its own immigration controls: Joint Declaration, su-
pra note 61, Annex I, ch. XIV. Regardless of legality, the decision triggered a
“diplomatic crisis.” 2 Dec. 2014, PARL. DEB., H.C. (2014) 180 (U.K.) (speech by
Sandra Osborne MP during an emergency debate on the issue).
414. See The UK’s Relations With Hong Kong: 30 Years After The Joint Dec-
laration, supra note 412.
415. Foreign Affairs Committee, The UK’s Relations With Hong Kong: 30
Years After the Joint Declaration, 2014–15, H.C. 649 (U.K.) [hereinafter FAC
Report].
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“misleading” and “evasive” language in defending the 2014 De-
cision,416 as well as the FCO’s weak response to the Chinese re-
fusal to allow the FAC to visit Hong Kong.417 The FAC also ex-
pressed concern that the FCO’s “lack of clarity” in commenting
on Hong Kong’s constitutional development led to the perception
that the FCO was primarily concerned with maintaining trade
relations with China.418 Regrettably, it seems unlikely that the
report will result in more robust British attitudes.419
Alternatively, the United Kingdom may threaten—or seek to
commence—international judicial proceedings. Although the
PRC’s lack of cooperation hinders the ability to bring such pro-
ceedings, it does not preclude them entirely. For instance, de-
spite Chinese non-participation, the Philippines’ arbitration pro-
ceedings in respect of the East Philippine Sea / South China Sea
dispute may nonetheless exert moral and political pressure on
China.420 Although contested ICJ proceedings cannot take place
without Chinese cooperation, a British offer to refer disputes
416. See FAC Report, supra note 415, ch. 5, ¶¶ 53–57, at 30–32. For instance,
Hugo Swire–the author of the op-eds that attracted a hostile response from
Beijing in 2013–defended the 2014 Decision by arguing that “[a] genuine choice
can mean something different from what we would regard as a genuine choice
and from what other democracies around the world regard as a genuine
choice.” Rt. Hon. Hugo Swire MP, Minister of State, FCO, Evidence Given to
FAC Inquiry, Jan. 13, 2015, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/com-
mitteeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-committee/the-uks-rela-
tions-with-hong-kong-30-years-after-the-joint-declaration/oral/17498.html
(answer to Q362). See also Stephen Lillie, Director, Asia-Pacific, FCO, Evi-
dence Given to FAC Inquiry, Jan. 13, 2015, http://data.parliament.uk/written-
evidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-commit-
tee/the-uks-relations-with-hong-kong-30-years-after-the-joint-declara-
tion/oral/17498.html (answer to Q371). The FCO had in previous years been
rather more robust. See Keith Bradsher, China Bars Steps by Hong Kong To-
ward More Democratic Voting, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2004 (Bill Rammell, then
FCO minister for China and Hong Kong, alleged that the 2004 Decision was
inconsistent with a “high degree of autonomy” for Hong Kong).
417. See FAC Report, supra note 415, ch. 1, ¶¶ 4–7, at 10–11.
418. Id. at 7, ¶¶ 90–92, at 47–48.
419. The FCO rejected many of the recommendations in the FAC Report. See
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Government Response to the House of Com-
mons Foreign Affairs Committee Report: The UK’s Relations With Hong Kong:
30 Years After the Joint Declaration, 2015, Cm. 9038.
420. Greg Torode, Philippines South China Sea Legal Case Against China
Gathers Pace, REUTERS, Sept. 27, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/ar-
ticle/2013/09/27/us-china-philippines-idUSBRE98Q0BX20130927.
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over Hong Kong’s democratization to the ICJ—perhaps in con-
junction with an effort to procure a U.N. General Assembly re-
quest for an Advisory Opinion, as occurred with the Palestine
Wall case—may be capable of exerting similar pressure on
China.
Conduct by third States provides a further, if less plausible,
possibility for enforcement. Hong Kong’s limited international
capacity is a function of its constitutional order under the Basic
Law.421 It may therefore be open to third States to enforce the
PRC’s obligations erga omneswith respect to Hong Kong (insofar
as such obligations exist) by ceasing to recognize Hong Kong as
having any separate international capacity at all. Hong Kong
currently enjoys its own bilateral economic and cultural ties
with the United States and the European Union;422 Hong Kong
SAR passport holders enjoy visa-free access to a significantly
larger number of countries than holders of ordinary PRC pass-
ports.423 Any suspension or cessation in third States’ recognition
of Hong Kong’s limited international personality—as contem-
plated in the US—Hong Kong Policy Act424—may constitute a
valid countermeasure under international law in the event of se-
vere Chinese inroads into Hong Kong’s autonomy under the
Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.425
Ultimately, however, the efficacy of such measures is question-
able. As Langer observed in 2008, the United Kingdom was not
in a position to impose its own views on the Joint Declaration on
421. Langer, supra note 378, at 333.
422. Id. at 339–41.
423. Visa-Free Access for HKSAR Passports, GOVHK,
http://www.gov.hk/en/residents/immigration/traveldoc/hksarpassport/visaf-
reeaccess.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2013); Mark Johanson, The Best Passports
to Have for Unrestricted Travel Around the World, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 11,
2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/best-passports-have-unrestricted-travel-
around-world-1422038.
424. United States-Hong Kong Policy Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5701–5732 (2010).
425. A bipartisan group of Representatives has suggested updating the US–
Hong Kong Policy Act and reinstating the requirement under that Act that the
State Department prepare annual reports into conditions in Hong Kong. See
Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, H.R. 1159, 114th Cong. (2015).
See also Press Release, Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ), Bipartisan Group
of Legislators Announces Bill to Ensure that U.S. Policy Supports Hong Kong’s
Freedom and Democracy (Feb. 27, 2015),
http://chrissmith.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=397953.
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China.426 China’s subsequent growth in economic stature can
only have weakened the United Kingdom’s position further, as
reflected in the FCO’s insipid response to the 2014 Decision and
to Chinese obstruction of the FAC inquiry. 427 Perhaps most
alarmingly, PRC leadership under Xi Jinping has shown in-
creasing hostility toward universal values and constitutional
government.428 The PRC may be in grave dereliction of its inter-
national law duties with respect to Hong Kong, but it is unlikely
to respond to international remonstration for the foreseeable fu-
ture.
CONCLUSION: THEY’LLMAKE A FOOL OF YOU
Hong Kong’s current predicament flows, in large part, from
China’s consistent refusal to allow Hong Kong’s own population
to have any meaningful participation in deciding its own fu-
ture.429 The removal of Hong Kong from the list of Non-Self-Gov-
erning Territories took place at the PRC’s behest, with no con-
sultation of the Hong Kong public. Sir Edward Youde’s presence
as a representative of the Hong Kong people (albeit an unelected
one) at the Sino-British negotiations leading to the Joint Decla-
ration was roundly rejected by the PRC Foreign Ministry. Hong
Kong civil society had minimal input in the drafting of the Basic
Law; pro-democracy voices in the Drafting Committee were ex-
pelled or ignored after the Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989.
After the establishment of the Hong Kong SAR in 1997, the PRC
has consistently moved to seize control of the political reform
process and throttle democratic reforms.430 Faced with a cri de
coeur from pro-democracy advocates in the form of Occupy Cen-
tral, Beijing’s representatives in Hong Kong threatened to de-
clare a state of emergency. Although the Umbrella Movement
426. Langer, supra note 378, at 343.
427. Supra, pp. 180–183.
428. See Document 9, supra note 37.
429. Contra TOK, supra note 101, at 125–28.
430. Declassified British Government papers show that, as early as 1984,
then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher predicted Beijing would interfere in
Hong Kong’s affairs after 1997, as “[t]he Chinese had no concept of a free soci-
ety.” 憂回歸後中央干預 鍾士元倡「築壩」 [Fearing Central Government Inter-
ference After Handover, Sir David Akers-Jones Suggested “Dam-Building”],
MINGPAO (H.K.), Jan. 4, 2014.
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did not end with the large-scale bloodshed some feared, there are
signs of an ongoing campaign of governmental recriminations.431
The PRC’s lengthy history of obstructing democratization in
Hong Kong violates its commitments under the Joint Declara-
tion, the ICCPR, and customary international law. The PRC’s
promulgation of the Basic Law shows that it has chosen to allow
the Chief Executive to be chosen by elections rather than by con-
sultations; in such circumstances, a purposive interpretation of
the Joint Declaration militates against democratic “back-slid-
ing.” Established rules of treaty interpretation and emergent
rules of customary international law both suggest that Article
25(b) of the ICCPR applies to Hong Kong, notwithstanding the
United Kingdom’s initial reservations; any attempt by Beijing to
dictate political criteria for Chief Executive candidacy is there-
fore a breach of Article 25(b). The emergent principle of “demo-
cratic teleology” in customary international law further suggests
that the PRC may not renege on its promise of democracy in
Hong Kong.
Nonetheless, the prospect of enforcing China’s international
law obligations in respect of Hong Kong is slim. In the absence
of any individual right to petition or of ICJ compulsory jurisdic-
tion, available options for enforcement are limited. Other op-
tions for enforcement such as unilateral monitoring by the
United Kingdom, the threat of an advisory opinion, or third-
State conduct exist. However, Chinese obstinacy—even toward
the United Kingdom, its counterparty in the Joint Declaration—
casts doubt on the effectiveness of such measures.
Ultimately, the enforcement of China’s international law obli-
gations with respect to Hong Kong’s democratization may de-
pend on non-State actors. China has long emphasized that it val-
ues Hong Kong’s economic stability and prosperity; 432 demo-
cratic reforms are therefore likely to be justifiable to Beijing only
insofar as they fulfill these objectives. The U.S.-Hong Kong Pol-
icy Act—with its implicit threat that the United States will cease
431. See, e.g., S.C. Yeung, Graffiti Girl—Police Killing a Chick to Scare the
Monkeys, EJINSIGHT (H.K.), Jan. 2, 2015, http://www.ejinsight.com/20150102-
graffiti-girl-police-killing-a-chick-to-scare-monkeys/ (translation of an op-ed in
the Hong Kong Economic Journal).
432. See, e.g., Hu Reaffirms Support to Hong Kong’s Stability, Prosperity,
XINHUA, Nov. 11, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-
11/12/c_131242195.htm.
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to recognize Hong Kong as having any distinct international le-
gal personality—is an especially potent economic incentive.
Nonetheless, private actors, with none of the political baggage
that governmental intervention carries, can bring greater pres-
sure to bear. American Bar Association President James Silke-
nat warned that failed political reforms might drive interna-
tional financial and legal institutions to Shanghai and Singa-
pore.433 Ultimately, a combination of foreign investment and
Hong Kong civil society may be the most effective means to pre-
vent China from backtracking further on its commitments to
Hong Kong. However, in light of increasing PRC invective
against the “value bombs” of constitutionalism and human
rights,434 and continued hostility toward democracy by pro-Bei-
jing politicians in Hong Kong,435 the prospects for genuine elec-
tions in Hong Kong remain grim.
China’s disregard of the Joint Declaration also holds broader
lessons, at home and abroad. Hong Kongers should be alarmed
by Beijing’s overt abandonment of the Joint Declaration. Absent
political willingness in the Hong Kong and Beijing Governments
to protect Hong Kong’s autonomy and allow meaningful democ-
ratization, international law may become one of the few effective
remaining means of exerting pressure. Beijing’s disregard for
the Joint Declaration suggests that Hong Kong residents, al-
ready wary of growing Mainland encroachment into their city’s
433. Tanna Chong, Foreign Firms may Flee Hong Kong if Reforms go Wrong
Way: Top US Lawyer, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), Nov. 5, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1347760/foreign-firms-may-flee-
hong-kong-if-reforms-go-wrong-way-top-us.
434. Party media and officials have increasingly turned to “militaristic met-
aphors” in criticizing ideas, such as constitutionalism. Value Bombs, CHINA
MEDIA PROJECT, http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/10/02/34224/ (last visited Nov. 8,
2013). See also Document 9, supra note 37.
435. Ann Chiang Lai-wan, a member of the pro-Beijing Democratic Alliance
for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), claimed that popular
elections would result in “many incidents.” 蔣麗芸：普選會製造很多事端 [Ann
Chiang: Universal Suffrage Will Create Numerous Incidents], MINGPAO
INSTANT NEWS (Jan. 5, 2014, 5:01 PM),
http://news2.mingpao.com/ins/%E8%94%A3%E9%BA%97%E8%8A%B8%EF%
BC%9A%E6%99%AE%E9%81%B8%E6%9C%83%E8%A3%BD%E9%80%A0%
E5%BE%88%E5%A4%9A%E4%BA%8B%E7%AB%AF/web_tc/article/2014010
5/s00001/1388912533900.
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affairs,436 should expect further incursions into their civil liber-
ties, ostensibly guaranteed by the ICCPR and the Joint Declara-
tion.437
China’s treatment of the Joint Declaration should also alarm
its international neighbors, despite its newly conciliatory tone in
foreign relations.438 ASEAN members, for instance, would be
right to wonder whether China would abide by a maritime Code
of Conduct–even if one could ultimately be agreed upon.439 For
all of Beijing’s professed respect for the “international rule of
law,”440 China’s disregard of its obligations toward Hong Kong
suggests that such rhetoric—like the emphasis on domestic “rule
of law” issues at the Fourth Plenum in 2014 441—should be
viewed with skepticism.
436. See, e.g., James Pomfret, In HK, China Likely to Use Pressure, Intimi-
dation to Ward Off More Protests, REUTERS, Dec. 12, 2014, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/12/us-hongkong-china-campaign-
idUSKBN0JQ0W720141212?irpc=932.
437. Inroads into press freedoms, for instance, have increasingly received in-
ternational attention. See, e.g., PEN America, Threatened Harbor: Encroach-
ments on Press Freedom in Hong Kong (2015), Int’l Fed’n of Journalists,
China’s Media War: Censorship, Corruption & Control (2015). See also FAC
Report, supra note 415, ch. 6.
438. See, e.g.,MatthewMiller,China’s Xi Strikes Conciliatory Note, Broadens
Diplomatic Focus, REUTERS, Nov. 30, 2014, available at http://www.reu-
ters.com/article/2014/11/30/us-china-southchinasea-
idUSKCN0JE04J20141130.
439. See Amanda Fernandez, ASEAN Countries Agree to Discuss Code of
Conduct in South China Sea, GMA NEWS (Manila), Nov. 13, 2014,
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/387868/news/nation/asean-countries-
agree-to-discuss-code-of-conduct-in-south-china-sea.
440. Full Text of Chinese FM’s Signed Article on Int’l Rule of Law, XINHUA,
Oct. 24, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-
10/24/c_133740723_2.htm.
441. See, e.g., Carl Minzner, After the Fourth Plenum: What Direction for Law
in China?, CHINA BRIEF (Nov. 20, 2014, 1:47 PM), http://www.jame-
stown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43105.

